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ABSTRACT
Since the 1800s, the United States has sought to advance its interests in what
currently exists as the Lebanese Republic. This assessment will look at the shape that
policy has taken since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in the context of historical relations.
After doing so, three questions will be addressed: What have been the policies of Iran and
Syria toward Lebanon during this time period, how effective has U.S. policy been since
2006 in undermining Iranian and Syrian influence and what policies should the United
States adopt to offset future destabilizing influence from these countries. It is concluded
that the current policy suffers from substantial contradictions and shortcomings in
addressing the Syrian and Iranian threats, particularly regarding Hezbollah. A new policy
in the form of enhanced military and developmental support is advocated, as are steps to
encourage rapprochement between Lebanon and its neighbors.
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―Aeschylus wrote: In sleep, pain that cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the
heart and in our despair, against our will comes wisdom through the awful grace of God.
What we need […] is not division, what we need […] is not hatred, what we need […] is
not violence or lawlessness, but love and wisdom and compassion toward one another,
and a feeling of justice toward those who still suffer […]. Let us dedicate ourselves to
what the Greeks wrote so many years ago: to tame the savageness of man and make
gentle the life of this world.‖
-Robert Kennedy – Indianapolis, 1968
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Chapter One – Overview of the Analysis
Introduction
Since the 1800s, the United States has been involved in the affairs of what is now
the Lebanese Republic, and has played an important role in influencing developments in
the area. During the 19th century, missionaries contributed to the health and education
sectors and promoted Christianity by printing the bible in Arabic.1 These efforts were
intended to attract Ottomans to Christianity by familiarizing the Christians of the region
with the values of Protestants in the United States through promoting modernity,
education and commercial connections. The missionary experience can be understood as
an early Wilsonian endeavor of bringing Christians together, while also bringing nonChristians into the mix as they admired the success of the Christians.2
Americans made a significant contribution to the future Lebanese Republic by
launching the Syrian Protestant College in 1866, which would provide educational
opportunities, ―[…] for all conditions and classes of men without regard to color,
nationality, race or religion.‖ 3 This institution eventually became the American

1

Presbyterian Church USA - General Assembly Mission Council, Lebanon,
http://gamc.pcusa.org/ministries/global/lebanon/ (accessed May 17, 2011).
2

Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 158-162. Discussed in Mead‘s chapter on Wilsonianism.
3

American University of Beirut, History, http://www.aub.edu.lb/main/about/Pages/history.aspx (accessed
April 6, 2011).

1

University of Beirut, a university that has trained students in such useful fields as
medicine, nursing, dentistry, engineering, agriculture and business. 4
By the mid 20th century, the relationship between the United States and Lebanon
evolved from one characterized by religious-led development support to that of a
superpower seeking to advance its strategic interests of containing communism during
the Cold War. The methods of U.S. involvement may have changed with the centuries,
but the Wilsonian concept of actively promoting American interests in the country did
not. Lebanon remained strategically important to the United States through the
containment of communism during the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War efforts to
secure Israel and contain Iran.
With U.S.-Lebanon relations now in its third century, the strategic importance of
Lebanon has become all the more salient as Hezbollah, a group considered by the United
States to be a terrorist organization, 5 has gained political and military power in the
country and threatens both the stability of Lebanon and the security of Israel. Under both
the Bush and Obama Administrations, the United States has provided substantial support
to the Lebanese government,6 seeking to bring stability to this often volatile country.
Moreover, the growing power and influence of Iran in the Middle East 7 makes its support

4

American University of Beirut n.d.

5

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook [Lebanon],
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html (accessed April 30, 2011).
6

Casey L. Addis, "U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon," Congressional Research Service Report,
Congressional Research Service (September 1, 2010),
http://knxasl.hsdl.org/?view&doc=129768&coll=limited (accessed April 27,), 2-3.
7

Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Three Rivers
Press, 2008).
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of Hezbollah a serious cause for concern for the United States, given U.S. interests in
Lebanese stability and the strong Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon through
Hezbollah. This thesis seeks to address the following questions: What have been the
policies of Iran and Syria toward Lebanon during this time period, how effective has U.S.
policy been since 2006 in undermining Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon and what
policies should the United States adopt to offset future destabilizing influence from these
countries.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to accomplish two tasks. First, I will
provide an overview of the specifics of U.S. policy toward Lebanon in the wake of the
2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, and will gauge the effectiveness of this policy in advancing
U.S. geostrategic goals of stabilizing Lebanon, protecting Israel and containing Iranian
power. Second, I will specify what future threats will be posed in Lebanon by Iran and
Syria, and will suggest how U.S. policy can be altered to address these threats while still
achieving the aforementioned U.S. interests in Lebanon.
Purpose of the Study
Initial research on U.S. policy toward Lebanon identified that the foreign policy
discourse lacks a critical assessment of the policy response to the 2006 war. There is also
no thorough assessment of what Iran and Syria‘s threats to U.S. interests in Lebanon will
be in the coming years, and how the current U.S. policy should be refined to address
those challenges. There are many works that offer significant contributions to the history
of U.S. and Iranian policy toward Lebanon, yet their age precludes them from drawing
events since the 2006 war into their assessments, let alone many of the major
developments over the past year. The discourse also is in need of a contribution that
3

sheds light on how the United States can both offset Iranian and Syrian influence in
Lebanon, while at the same time helping develop the Lebanese economy and society.
A second fact that influenced the decision to conduct this study concerns the high
stakes for ensuring stability in Lebanon. These stakes are likely to exist into the
foreseeable future. It has been reported that Hezbollah has recently increased the number
of weapons positioned in Lebanon.8 Furthermore, it is also believed by the Israeli
government that Hezbollah may have SCUD missile capabilities as of late.9 The
presence of these weapons increases the likelihood of another military confrontation
between Israel and Hezbollah, especially if tensions escalate between Israel and Iran over
the alleged Iranian nuclear program. 10
Iran‘s efforts towards Middle East hegemony also underline the need for the
United States to place policy toward Lebanon under the microscope. The Iranian
regime‘s links to Hezbollah and possible nuclear weapons program presents the United
States with a major threat to its interests and a key opportunity to strike a blow to the
heart of Iran‘s hegemonic quest.11
This study is also being pursued in response to the shortcomings that have
emerged in the post-2006 U.S. policy. Funding for a military assistance deal negotiated
8

Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Point of No Return," The Atlantic (September 2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186/ (accessed April 26,
2011).
9

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Hizbullah's Alleged SCUDS Raise Storm Clouds Over
Lebanon," Strategic Comments (June, 2010),
http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=42222 (accessed April 26, 2011).
10

Goldberg 2010, Goldberg posits that Hezbollah could launch an attack on Israel in response to an Israeli
attack on Iran‘s nuclear program.
11

Baer 2008, 51-57, Baer discusses in these pages the centrality of Lebanon in Iran‘s hegemonic
endeavors.
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between the United States and Lebanon was suspended for several months in fall 2010.12
Additionally, the ―unprecedentedly warm welcome‖ given to Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad during a recent visit to Lebanon indicates the popularity of the Iranian
leader amongst citizens and politicians in Lebanon.13 Also disconcerting are reports of
future Iranian assistance programs to Lebanon at a time when Washington‘s commitment
to Beirut is uncertain.14 While the United States has sought to restrict the flow of arms to
Hezbollah and reinforce the integrity of the Lebanese central government, there have
been major deficiencies in reaching these ends. Despite international pressure to disarm,
Hezbollah now boasts a larger arsenal than they had during the 2006 conflict. 15
Moreover, the scope of Hezbollah‘s militia could potentially increase as ties between Iran
and the Lebanese government become stronger.
A final reason for this study is the geostrategic significance of Lebanon to the
United States. From the Eisenhower Administration, through the deployment of U.S.
troops in Lebanon by the Reagan Administration16 to the commitments of the George W.

12

Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, "U.S. Lawmakers Drop Hold on Aid to Lebanese Military," The Wall
Street Journal (November 13, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704865704575610993378651882.html (accessed April
27, 2011).
13

Fars News Agency, "Ahmadinejad Felicitates Lebanon on National Day," Fars News Agency (November
21, 2010), http://english.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8908301417 (accessed April 27, 2011).
14

Dominic Evans, "Ahmadinejad Trip Highlights Iranian Sway in Lebanon," Reuters Africa (October 11,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/11/us-lebanon-iran-idUSTRE69A1KC20101011 (accessed
April 26, 2011).
15

Goldberg 2010.

16

Kail C. Ellis, "U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon," In Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the TwentyFirst Century, edited by Kail C. Ellis, 91-114 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), Discusses
President Eisenhower‘s conviction that Lebanese, ―‘independence and integrity […are…] vital to the [U.S.]
national interest and world peace.‘‖ (p. 91-92) Also acknowledges U.S. military involvement in Lebanon
during the civil war, and the presence of U.S. troops in the country. (p. 94-97).
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Bush and Obama Administrations,17 Lebanese stability has played a vital role in
advancing the strategic interests of the United States in the Middle East. Given
Lebanon‘s importance to the United States, policymakers and scholars must constantly
reassess U.S. policy toward this strategic asset and evaluate whether or not a given policy
is achieving its objectives.
It is hoped that this project will make a contribution to the discourse on U.S.
foreign policy toward the Middle East, and will prompt debate as to how best the United
States can continue to advance its interests. It will shed light on how Lebanon policy is
made at the nexus of complex issues such as nuclear proliferation, Israeli security and the
economic development of a conflict-prone country. The analysis presented will clarify
how each of these must be taken into account in crafting policy and in evaluating a
policy‘s efficacy. As for the Iranian threat, this thesis will expose how Iran‘s danger is
not limited to the threat posed by a hypothetical nuclear arsenal, but is more realistically
posed by the complex network of proxies that the Iranian regime has fostered the growth
of throughout the region. 18
Work Plan and Methodology
This thesis will explore the impact of Iranian, Syrian and U.S. foreign policies as
factors impacting the promotion of U.S. interests in Lebanon. The role of the U.S. in
Lebanon will be discussed in detail in the next chapter as the history of U.S. policy from
the middle of the 20th century to the present is detailed. The many facets of the Iranian
17

Addis September 1, 2010, 2-3.

18

Baer 2008, In his fifth chapter, entitled ―Lethal and Elusive: Why Iran‘s Weapons and Tactics Make it
Unconquerable – Even Without Nukes,‖ Baer sheds light on the importance of unconventional tools of
warfare at Iran‘s disposal relative to that of nuclear weapons.
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and Syrian policies will be discussed in Chapter Three, with the analysis of U.S. policy
offered in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will outline the policy recommendations based on
the findings of the analysis, with concluding remarks offered in Chapter Six.
Research for this thesis was conducted at both the qualitative and quantitative
levels. Qualitative research consisted of an evaluation of primary and secondary sources
relating to what U.S. policy goals have been in Lebanon since 2006, how the United
States has succeeded or fallen short of its objectives, what the Syrian and Iranian policies
have been toward Lebanon, what the new challenges are and how the policy should
change to address those challenges. The published sources range from government
documents, journal articles, scholarly books and Congressional committee hearings.
Specific examples include reports from prominent think tanks such as the International
Institute for Strategic Studies and an assortment of books by prominent observers of U.S.
policy and Lebanese affairs.
Kail C. Ellis provides a detailed account of the Lebanese civil war that lasted
from the mid 1970s through the 1980s. He specifically sheds light on the numerous
changes in U.S. policy that took place over that period of time. These shifts include
going from allowing the passage of the U.N. Security Council‘s (UNSC) resolution
summoning the end of Israeli aggression against Lebanon in the 1970s, to the subsequent
endorsement of the 1982 Israeli invasion to later concerns for regional peace and the
subsequent retreat of the United States from Lebanon in the mid-1980s. Ellis‘ historical
overview and analysis will be of use in summarizing the history of U.S. policy in
Lebanon, particularly the inconsistencies in policy that existed during the civil war as a
result of changing perceptions in the U.S. government of what the most important U.S.
7

interests were. Despite the depth of his analysis, its publication in the early 2000s limits
the scope of his assessment to the civil war and post-civil war period, and not of the 2006
and post-2006 era.19
H.E. Chehabi provides valuable insight into the relationship between Iran and
Lebanon. While his assessment goes back over 500 years of regional history, his
detailing of Iran‘s impact on civil war-era culture and militancy in Lebanon‘s Shi‘ite
communities is of interest, and is useful in highlighting the development of the resistance
movement during the civil war. The depth of Chehabi‘s analysis into the Hezbollah-Iran
relationship through the 1980s and into the 1990s is helpful in providing historical
overview, but again, the publication of the book in 2006 limits the scope of the study. 20
The intelligence expert Robert Baer addresses the hegemonic aspiration of Iran,
and how Iran‘s policy in Lebanon, specifically with regards to Hezbollah, fits into a
broad framework of how the Iranian regime seeks to influence developments throughout
the Middle East. While focusing on the Iran-Hezbollah connection, Baer spends less
time helping the reader understand the need for an organization such as Hezbollah in
Lebanon. The book‘s publication in 2008 also means that significant developments over
the past several years are absent from the analysis. These developments will be discussed
in detail in Chapter Three.21
To complement the published sources, an interview was conducted with former
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill. The purpose of this interview was to gain
19

Ellis 2002.

20

H.E. Chehabi, ed., Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (New York: Centre for
Lebanese Studies in Association with I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2006).
21

Baer 2008.
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insight into the decision-making process in the U.S. government during the 2006 war, as
well as perspective on how the United States can strengthen its relationship with
Lebanon.
Quantitative research focused on data from the U.S. Department of State, with
specific attention to economic and military assistance figures for Lebanon. Additionally,
the online data resources of the World Bank and the Central Intelligence Agency have
been utilized in compiling and analyzing economic data on Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan
and Turkey. This data is presented in the sections that address how economic
development has been used in the past and can be used in the future as a tool of U.S.
policy to promote stability.
The assessment of U.S. policy since 2006 is an analysis based on the theoretical
contributions of Northedge and Chittick. Rather than focusing on the creation of policy
and how the policy emerged from the bureaucratic process, this analysis will study what
William Chittick calls ―foreign policy outputs [emphasis in original].‖ 22 By first
delineating the interests and goals of the United States in Lebanon, I will then determine
whether or not those interests and goals have been advanced based on the policies of the
past five years. Chittick discusses the concept of foreign policy outputs analysis, in
which he considers outputs to be ―[…] the concrete actions, or inactions, of states in
relation to their environments.‖23 He discusses such concepts as ―inputs‖ and ―processes

22

Williom O. Chittick, "The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy," In The Analysis of Foreign Policy
Outputs, edited by William O. Chittick, 1-29 (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company,
1975), 12.
23

Chittick 1975, 12
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[italics in original]‖ that play a role in the crafting of policy, 24 but again, the concern of
this assessment is strictly on assessing the stated interests of the United States vis-à-vis
the results of the policy.
An analysis of outputs, according to Chittick, requires the analyst to select one of
several ―Typologies of Foreign Policy Outputs [italics in original].‖25 For the purpose of
this assessment, Chittick‘s second typology will be used, which focuses on ―functional
types [of policy], such as political, economic, and military.‖ 26 The policy
recommendations made in Chapter Five will be made within the framework of these three
areas, and the assessment made in Chapter Four will break down the policy assessment
into similar policy areas.
Another valuable framework for policy analysis has been put forward by F.S.
Northedge, who posits that:
[…] ‗success‘ in foreign policy may be broadly defined as the achievement of
declared, publicized or recognized objects of state policy, the maintenance or
advancement of prestige or influence abroad, and the abandonment of interests
only in return for the gaining of comparable or if possible weightier interests. 27
Northedge also stresses the importance of whether a policy is ―timely‖ 28 and also whether
it is ―internally consistent or self-contradictory.‖29 These concepts of the advancement of
interests and consistency will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Four.
24

Chittick 1975, 20.

25

Chittick 1975, 14.

26

Chittick 1975, 15.

27

F.S. Northedge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy," In The Foreign Policies of the Powers, edited by F.S.
Northedge, 9-39 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 35.
28

Northedge 1968, 36.
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Outline
The second chapter is entitled ―American Policy in Lebanon: 1958-2011,‖ and is
divided into five sections. This chapter explores the history of U.S.-Lebanon relations
since the Eisenhower Administration, which was a critical point in defining the emerging
relationship. It also sheds light on the 2006 war and the response it prompted from the
United States, followed by a detailing of the new strategic environment that emerged
after the war. Last, the post-2006 war policy response of the United States is explained.
The third chapter, ―Threats From Iran and Syria,‖ ascertains current threats posed
by the influence of Iranian and Syrian policies in Lebanon. It outlines the circumstances
that led to the emergence of Hezbollah, and the support that Iran and Syria has provided
to that organization. Trends toward a closer relationship between the governments in
Tehran and Beirut are also discussed. Syria‘s role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and
the impact that Iran can have on influencing Syria‘s position on that conflict are also
highlighted; influence that would undoubtedly have an effect on Lebanon. Iran‘s
potential nuclear program and the threats associated with it as relates to Lebanon are
explored as well. Such threats involve the possible effects of an American or Israeli
preemptive strike against Iran‘s nuclear infrastructure, as well as the possible effects of
an Iranian nuclear arsenal on Hezbollah‘s power and relations with Israel.
The fourth chapter provides an outputs analysis of U.S. policy in Lebanon from
2006-2011 using the frameworks posited by Chittick and Northedge. The policy
objectives outlined toward the end of Chapter Two are revisited, and the success of the
United States in advancing those objectives measured. This chapter also offers a broader
29

Northedge 1968, 37.
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critique of the post-2006 policy in the form of criticism of a realist approach to Lebanon
and a discussion of the policy‘s contradictions.
Chapter Five makes normative claims on what shape the new policy toward
Lebanon should take given the lessons of the previous chapter. Policy recommendations
are divided into three broad fields: military relations, political relations and economic
development relations. These recommendations take into account the evolving threats
posed by Iran and Syria in Lebanon as delineated in Chapter Three.
The military relations section suggests how the United States can use military
training and material support to Lebanon to continue efforts to strengthen the Lebanese
central government in relation to Hezbollah. The political relations section looks closely
at what can be done at both the bilateral and multilateral levels to engage the Lebanese
government and neighboring states diplomatically to promote stability. The economic
development relations section highlights measures that can be taken to promote stability
through economic growth in Lebanon. A premise of this section is that economic wellbeing could help foster political stability within the country. 30 This section also addresses

30

Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (March, 1959): 69-105,
http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/mcooper/ps744readings/lipset.pdf (accessed April 27, 2011), 83.
Lipset discusses economic growth as a means of driving democratization.
Eva Bellin, "The Political-Economic Conundrum." In Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the
Middle East, edited by Thomas and Marina Ottaway Carothers, 131-150 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 144. Bellin discusses how improving the economic
environment in the Middle East can help curb the proliferation of terrorism and enhance the prospects for
the existance of democracy.
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how economic development in Lebanon can penetrate Shiite communities as well to raise
the quality of life for those individuals. 31
The final chapter summarizes the findings of this research project in the context
of the Wilsonian approach to international relations. It also explores the dangers of
maintaining the status-quo policy toward Lebanon, and the challenges ahead for the
United States.

31

Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development, 9th Edition (San Francisco: Pearson,
2006), 22. Todaro and Smith point out that one of the ―objectives‖ of economic development is, ―To raise
levels of living [emphasis in original], including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs,
better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values, all of which will serve not only to
enhance material well-being but also to generate individual and national self-esteem.‖ Given this
argument, wide-scale economic development as a goal of U.S. policy in Lebanon could be used to help
improve the quality of life of all demographics.
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Chapter Two – American Policy in Lebanon: 1958-2011
Introduction
The second chapter of this research project addresses three questions that must be
answered before one can explore what future policies can be pursued by the United States
in Lebanon. For one, what has the U.S. policy been in Lebanon since it became a
geostrategic asset in the 1950s generally and since 2006 specifically. Second, what
developments led to the breakout of the 2006 war, and what was the strategic
environment that the war yielded. Last, how did the United States respond after the war
within the context of both historical U.S.-Lebanese relations and the new strategic
environment.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Lebanon: A Brief Historical Overview
In order to understand the policy that has been pursued by the United States in
Lebanon since 2006, one must have an understanding of how the United States has
identified its interests in Lebanon and the region in the past. The reader can also gain a
better idea of how the 2006 conflict compares to previous periods of violence in Lebanon
in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s as well as how the U.S. response in 2006 differed relative
to previous conflicts.
Early U.S.-Lebanese Relations
The identification of Lebanon as a strategic asset to the United States originated
during the 1950s. In the post-World War II environment, U.S. strategic interests in the
14

Middle East centered primarily on ensuring the protection of the newly-formed Israeli
state, protecting the rich oil reserves of the region and preventing Soviet expansion into
the area.32 Lebanon began to factor into the third of these strategic interests, the
containment of the Soviet Union, under the administration of President Dwight
Eisenhower. As the Cold War unfolded, President Eisenhower sought a means through
which the proliferation of communism could be avoided. Such measures were seen as
necessary in the wake of Arab nationalism‘s emergence under the leadership of Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952. These nationalist sentiments were perceived by
the United States as being linked to communism. Thus, the United States responded with
the Eisenhower Doctrine, which would serve the interest of limiting the expansion of
communism. It is under the Eisenhower Doctrine that the United States made its first
commitment of troops to Lebanon in 1958.33
The 1958 deployment stemmed from the belief that Arab nationalism could
penetrate Lebanese society. With concerns over the possible results of the 1957 elections
in Lebanon, the Central Intelligence Agency provided support to the non-Arab nationalist
incumbent President Camille Chamoun. The apparent corruption in this election sparked
a civil war in which the United States contributed forces.34
Further light can be shed on this intervention by looking at the statements made
by President Eisenhower at the time of these events. In a radio statement on July 15,
1958, the president expressed concern about the coup that had taken place in Iraq the
32

Ellis 2002, 91.

33

Ellis 2002, 91-92.

34

Ellis 2002, 92-93.
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previous day, as well as a report of an attempted coup in Jordan. Within this context,
Lebanon was ensconced in a conflict, which according to the president, was ―[…]
actively fomented by Soviet and Cairo broadcasts and abetted and aided by substantial
amounts of arms, money, and personnel infiltrated into Lebanon across the Syrian
border.‖35
President Eisenhower perceived these developments, as evidenced in his speech,
as being the result of efforts by the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East. He
discusses four factors that appear to have driven his decision to send U.S. forces to
Lebanon. The two most salient appear to be to safeguard the ―about 2,500 Americans in
Lebanon‖ as well as ―[…] to assist the Government of Lebanon to preserve its territorial
integrity and political independence.‖36 Further motivations for involvement included the
Lebanese President‘s request for the United States to intervene in the conflict to ensure
Lebanese security, as well as the desire of President Eisenhower to uphold the
commitment of the United Nations to ensure that the meddlesome actions of some states
did not impact the sovereignty and security of others.37 It is in this context that Lebanon
began to factor significantly in Washington‘s Cold War decisions, and U.S. forces were
sent to the country.

35

Dwigh D. Eisenhower, "The Crisis in Lebanon: Our Dedication to the Principles of the United Nations
Charter," Vital Speeches of the Day 24, no. 20 (August 1, 1958): 612-613, Accessed through Penrose
Library using Academic Search Complete, http://0web.ebscohost.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&hid=18&sid=16335fa9-5563408c-b19f-ed3b3dd4d644%40sessionmgr13 (accessed April 27, 2011), 612.
36

Eisenhower August 1, 1958, 612.

37

Eisenhower August 1, 1958, 612-613.
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Relations During the Civil War
The civil war that commenced in Lebanon in 1975 took place in the wake of two
regional developments in the late 1960s that impacted the Lebanese state. The first
concerns the 1968 Iraqi revolution which brought Ba‘athist leadership to that country.
This revolution triggered the flight of Iraqi Shiites to a new home in Lebanon. 38
The second development was the international legitimacy given to the
militarization of Palestinians within Lebanon under the Cairo Agreement of 1969. As a
result, Palestinian refugees were provided with a Lebanese staging ground for assaulting
Israel. 39 Many Palestinians had migrated from Jordan to Lebanon in the early 1970s after
they had been thrown out of the former, forming what has been described as a Palestinian
―‗state within a state‘‖ in Lebanon. 40 This migration has been called ―[…] a catalyst to
the increasing domestic stresses that contributed to the explosion,‖ as a conflict between
Lebanon‘s Maronite Catholics and the Palestinians sparked the civil war.41 The
Palestinian migration to Lebanon is also significant in that the PLOs eradication would
become a motivation for the Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1982. 42 Attempts were made
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in 1977 to remove PLO militants from Lebanon through the Chtaura Peace Accords.
However, the PLO remained active in violence despite that agreement.43
Another factor contributing to the civil war was the significant socio-political
conflicts within Lebanon during the mid-1970s. The distribution of political power had
become unrepresentative of the Lebanese population as the Shi‘ite Muslim share of the
population increased. This was significant due to fact that Lebanon‘s political structure
was based on a distribution of power that could not be reconciled with the new
population trends. This resulted in violence and foreign involvement, particularly from
Syria and Israel in support of the country‘s Christians.44
U.S. policy toward Lebanon during the civil war changed at several points as the
prioritization of U.S. interests changed. For example, the U.S. response to the 1978
Israeli invasion of Lebanon suggests American disapproval of Israel‘s acts. UNSC
Resolution 425, which mandated an Israeli pullout, was allowed to pass45 without a U.S.
veto. This reflects a tacit U.S. condemnation of the invasion.
As time passed and the administration in Washington changed, the U.S. policy
toward the war shifted. Kail C. Ellis states that, ―Israel invaded Lebanon again on 6 June
1982, allegedly with the blessing of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig […].‖46
Secretary Haig‘s supposed support for the Israeli invasion indicates the high premium
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placed by the Reagan Administration on the U.S. interest in protecting Israel‘s national
security. However, later developments in the Reagan Administration under Secretary of
State George Shultz indicate that the preservation of the Arab-Israeli peace process began
to take priority as a key interest of the United States in addressing the civil war in
Lebanon; an interest which was threatened by the Israeli incursion. As a result,
diplomatic action taken by the Reagan Administration to ensure that Israel‘s PLO pursuit
in Lebanon did not result in the fall of Beirut to the Israeli armed forces. This led to the
agreement to move the PLO from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, as well as proposed
Israeli-Lebanese talks for peace.47
Another complicating factor in U.S. policy during the civil war concerned the
involvement of Iran in the war, and the emergence of the militant group Hezbollah. In
1979, Iran had come under the leadership of an Islamic government and was no longer an
ally of the United States. The new Islamic Republic of Iran did not remain passive while
Lebanon was invaded by Israel. The Bekaa Valley became the grounds for Iranian
military and cultural influence as the Pasdaran imparted skills to the Shi‘ite resistance,
and as villages in the Bekaa began to adopt conservative Islamic orientation as a result of
Iranian influence. This influence involved the shunning of alcohol, the covering of
women and the proliferation of Iranian propaganda via radio.48
Meanwhile, the Lebanese National Resistance antagonized foreign forces
occupying Lebanon, including the United States, which dispatched troops in 1982 to
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facilitate the PLO‘s departure. 1983 proved to be a particularly devastating year for
United States armed forces and diplomats as the U.S. Embassy and troop barracks were
attacked in the spring and autumn of that year, respectively. 49
The final change in U.S. policy during the civil war occurred in 1984. Although
the United States launched retaliatory strikes following the barracks attack against
militants and Syria‘s weaponry, the United States gradually realized that U.S. interests in
the country could not be realized in the context of the civil war. Kail Ellis states, ―[a]fter
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1984, U.S. policy began to focus
almost entirely on securing the release of American and European hostages […].‖50
Relations After the Civil War
The post-civil war order in Lebanon was largely influenced by a 1989 agreement
reached by Lebanese officials in Ta‘if, Saudi Arabia: the Document of National
Reconciliation. The agreement, which had the support of the United States, facilitated
the imposition of substantial Syrian political control over Lebanon. 51 For example, the
stipulations of the Ta‘if Accord allowed for the deployment of the Syrian military within
Lebanon. The Accord states that, ―[…] the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces
of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon
with a set period of no more than 2 years […].‖52 Syrian military involvement in
Lebanon however would not necessarily terminate after those two years. The Accord
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stipulates that the Syrian and Lebanese governments could then jointly determine the
positioning of the Syrian military in the Bekaa Valley. Furthermore, the Accord
concludes by stating that neither Syria nor Lebanon could ever be allowed to pose a
threat to the security of the other.53
This agreement provided a means by which the United States could legitimize
Syria‘s role in Lebanon. Aside from the specific military aspects of the Accord, it called
for the division of political power in Lebanon among the different religious factions
within the country. The President was required to be a Christian, while the Prime
Minister and Speaker of Parliament must be Sunni and Shi‘ite, respectively. The
arrangement between the United States and Syria also ensured that the U.S.-backed
Lebanese leadership would pursue a pro-Syrian agenda. 54
The developments that followed the end of the civil war and the efforts to build a
post-war order in Lebanon indicate a perception in the United States that Syrian policy
would serve as a stabilizing variable in Lebanese affairs. The U.S. support for the Ta‘if
Accord shows an American acquiescence to Syrian political hegemony within Lebanon
in the critically important post-war rebuilding years. The political and security
environment in Lebanon was volatile at this time, but U.S. policy focused on allowing
leaders in Damascus to ensure that Lebanon remained stable while it returned to its feet
after a decade and a half of violence.
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In the seventeen years that followed the civil war, developments in Lebanon were
highly influenced by two countries: Israel and Syria. Significant Syrian interference,
including a troop presence, persisted in Lebanon until a popular uprising against Syrian
policy in 2005. Syrian meddling during this time ranged from its military presence, to
determining national leaders and crafting policy. 55 Israeli involvement took the form of
military operations. Israeli military strikes were launched four times in Lebanon between
the end of the civil war and the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. These strikes took place in
1993, 1996, 1998 and 1999. The basis for much of these operations was to diminish the
power of Hezbollah. 56
With regards to the 1993 Israeli military operation, dubbed Operation
Accountability, the United States was reluctant to take the steps necessary to prevent
aggression. Kail Ellis states that, ―[t]he United States deplored the violence but indicated
that it would not intervene in the case of another firestorm.‖ 57 This inaction set a
precedent that the United States would not directly intervene to prevent the outbreak of
violence in southern Lebanon.
The end of the Cold War had two key impacts on U.S. policy toward the Middle
East. First, the United States was no longer in a position where it needed to contain the
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Soviet Union from expanding into the region. Second, the roles played by Syria and
Israel were perceived by the United States as having advanced U.S. interests in Lebanon.
The disinclination of the United States to put an end to repeated Israeli military
operations in southern Lebanon is a clear example of this. It was believed by United
States that the Ta‘if Agreement would serve the dual interests of protecting the Israeli
state as well as stabilizing Lebanon.
The 2006 War: An Overview of the Conflict and the U.S. Response
The Sources of Conflict
Syria‘s political hegemony in Lebanon came to an end in 2005 in the wake of a
series of significant events. In 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1559, which mandated
that Syria‘s military be removed from Lebanon. While the United States had looked
favorably upon Syria‘s role in Lebanon in the 1990s, the 2000s saw less favorable
relations between Washington and Damascus. For one, the Syrian government was
opposed to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States. Moreover, it was believed by
the United States that Syria had become a safe-haven for ―[…] high-level Iraqi Baathists-perhaps even Saddam Hussein‘s sons […].‖58 There was also a belief that Syria was,
―[…] allowing military equipment and jihadi [italics in original] fighters to cross into
Iraq.‖59
Within Lebanon itself, political leaders from the Sunni, Druze and Christian sects
came together in what Paul Salem describes as, ―[…] an anti-Syrian, pro-Western
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coalition.‖60 In February 2005, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a prominent member
of this nationalist movement, was assassinated in Beirut. His death prompted the
formation of the March 14 coalition, a popular movement in Lebanon which caused a
Syrian withdrawal in just a few short months. 61
These developments affected Hezbollah and their power in Lebanon. The 2000
removal of the Israeli military from did not represent a complete termination of Israeli
infringement upon Lebanese sovereignty. Israel continues to occupy the Shebaa Farms
area, and Hezbollah has used this to legitimize themselves since the broader Israeli
removal in 2000. This area of land is considered by the Lebanese to be part of Lebanon,
but is currently under occupation by Israel as part of the Golan Heights. 62 Moreover, as
Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs became mired in controversy by the mid-2000s,
Iran began to displace Syria in assisting Hezbollah in the context of this political
environment. 63 During the summer of 2006, Hezbollah took Israeli troops hostage; an
act which prompted Israeli airstrikes upon Lebanon64 and an Israeli invasion.65 What
ensued during the course of the Israeli operation that summer had tremendous effects on
the country‘s infrastructure: roads were hit,66 as were parts of Beirut‘s international
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airport.67 Economic assets such as power facilities, industrial locations68 and agricultural
areas were also hit.69
The American Response
The reaction of the United States to the Israeli aggression reflected the perception
by the U.S. leadership that Israel‘s use of force against Hezbollah served U.S. interests.
Several aspects of the U.S. reaction to the war prove this point. First, the United States
provided generous support to the Israeli armed forces during the course of the conflict.
Specifically, support was provided in the form of $300 million worth of aviation fuel 70 as
well as the transfer of ―precision-guided munitions.‖71
Second, despite pleas by the Lebanese government for a ceasefire, the United
States refused to allow a ceasefire resolution to pass the UNSC until well into the
conflict.72 Some light has been shed on the rationale for this delay by Ambassador
Christopher Hill. Ambassador Hill was overseas with Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice as events in Lebanon developed in 2006, giving him unique insight to the U.S.
response to the conflict. In an interview conducted by the author, the ambassador stated
that while Israel‘s invasion was never a goal of the United States, Washington did not see
it in its interests once the invasion had taken place to call for an immediate ceasefire. It
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was perceived that a ceasefire ―[…] was not going to lead to an improvement in the
conditions that led Israel to attack in the first place.‖73 Furthermore, the United States did
little if not nothing to criticize Israel for aggravating the volatile political environment in
Lebanon. In fact, Israel was rewarded by the United States for the operation through a
drastic increase in the U.S. defense assistance package. Cathy Sultan states that in 2007,
―[the] U.S. pledges Israel an additional $30.4 billion in military aid over the next ten
years [ten years presumably from 2007]. This was in addition to the $3.4 billion it
already received in military aid annually.‖74
The aforementioned post-World War II strategic interests of ensuring both the
security of Israel and the flow of oil from the Arab World are interests that have
transcended time and that continue to be pertinent today. While the threat posed by the
Soviet Union has dissipated in the wake of the union‘s collapse, today the United States
seeks to prevent the regional hegemony of another state: Iran. Although Iran was an ally
of the United States under the reign of the Shah, the country has grown antagonistic of
the United States and its regional policy in the wake of the 1979 revolution. The
destabilizing efforts by Iran committed in Lebanon through support for the Shia
resistance are delineated above. A more substantial analysis of Iran‘s effects on
Lebanese stability is discussed in Chapter Three. It is important to note however that a
key strategic interest of the United States in the Middle East which has assumed great
significance in the post-Cold War era is that of containing Iran.75 Their drive for
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influence in the region has led to, ―U.S., Israeli and Saudi Arabian competition with Iran
– and to a lesser extent Syria – over the shaping of the Middle East‘s security order in the
wake of Iraq in 2003.‖76
The Post-War Strategic Environment for the United States
The 2006 conflict and its aftermath reinforced an already dangerous strategic
environment for the United States that had been in place since the civil war. Hezbollah‘s
performance during the war and Israel‘s eventual disengagement from Lebanon without
disarming Hezbollah have triggered serious repercussions that have been felt throughout
the Middle East. These repercussions threaten the stability of Lebanon, the security of
Israel and the interest of containing Iranian regional power.
Israel’s Departure from Lebanon
Perhaps the most immediate consequence of the 2006 war as pertains to U.S.
interests were the mission shortcomings on the part of the Israeli government. On July
17, 2006, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert spoke before the Israeli Knesset, laying out the
Israeli rationale for going to war in Lebanon. Speaking with regards to terrorist
organizations, the prime minister stated:
It is a regional – as well as global – interest to take control and terminate their
[terrorist organizations‘] activity. […] We can all see how the majority of the
international community supports our battle against the terror organizations and
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our efforts to remove this threat from the Middle East. […] We intend to do this.
We will continue to operate in full force until we achieve this. 77
Prime Minister Olmert elaborated on his government‘s motives, stating what goals both
the international community and Israel were in concord on achieving:
The return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev; […] A
complete ceasefire; […] Deployment of the Lebanese Army in all of Southern
Lebanon; […] Expulsion of Hizballah from the area, and fulfillment of United
Nations Resolution 1559.78
History would show that despite these ambitious goals, the Israeli government
experienced significant mission shortcomings in the 2006 conflict.
By the end of the war, Israel was unable to secure the release of the hostages it
had sought to free earlier that July. In fact, the two Israeli hostages did not survive, and it
was not until two years after the conflict that their bodies were repatriated in a deal which
cost Israel five Lebanese captives.79 Furthermore, its goals of eliminating Hezbollah
never came to fruition. Thus, Israel failed to achieve two of its key objectives.
This was not the first instance that the Israeli government had fallen short of its
military objectives in Lebanon. Despite several military campaigns in Lebanon since the
late 1970s with the intent of improving its security, Hezbollah still exists. Once again,
following the 2006 conflict, Israel found itself with an extremist group just north of its
borders, wielding substantial power. As stated by Paul Salem:
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Israel, despite unleashing massive airpower on Hezbollah strongholds, failed to
knock out the organization or even to stop its missile attacks, while the setbacks
suffered by Israel‘s ground invasion had the effect of puncturing the aura of
invincibility long projected by the Israel Defense Forces.80
If the United States considers Israeli security to be a strategic interest in the Middle East,
then one must question the efficacy of repeated Israeli military operations in southern
Lebanon in advancing that interest. Not only has the Hezbollah threat persisted in the
wake of the previous military confrontations and the 2006 conflict, but it has also gained
a heightened level of political legitimacy both in Lebanon and throughout the region in
the wake of the conflict.
The Empowerment of Hezbollah
Robert Baer details how Hezbollah‘s political clout increased after 2006. He
describes the popularity of Hezbollah‘s Hassan Nasrallah in North Africa and the Levant
from Egypt to the West Bank and back to Lebanon. The reason, Baer argues, for this
iconic image of Nasrallah is the achievement in 2006. As Baer states, ―[…] Nasrallah
beat the Israelis on the field of battle, David slaying the Israeli Goliath.‖81
Hezbollah‘s public relations victory in Lebanon was also impacted by how the
organization engaged the Shia following the 2006 war. Much of the south of Beirut and
areas further south in Lebanon were badly damaged by the Israeli strikes, but Hezbollah
offered to cover the costs for rebuilding war-destroyed houses, as well as providing some
$12,000 cash per household. Moreover, the community reconstruction efforts made by
Hezbollah are suggested to have been more substantial and aggressive than the efforts
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undertaken by the Lebanese government itself. As Robert Fisk states, ―[i]ts
[Hezbollah‘s] massive new reconstruction effort – free of charge to all those Lebanese
whose homes were destroyed or damaged – […] has won the loyalty of even the most
disaffected members of the Shia community in Lebanon.‖ 82
Despite the fact that Hezbollah was much to blame for the outbreak of the war
with Israel, these efforts had a significant strategic implication for the United States. It
shed light on the inability of the Lebanese government to respond to the perceived needs
of the south of the country in both the security and economic sectors, whereas Hezbollah
was able not only to defend the area against Israel, but to start to rebuild it after the
conflict. Thus, Hezbollah, with its likely Iranian financing,83 was displacing the central
government, and enhancing its own public image.
A Victory for Iranian Hegemony
A final characteristic of the strategic environment that emerged after the 2006 war
regards the impact the war had on Iran‘s ability to seek regional hegemony in the Middle
East. In his work The Devil We Know, Robert Baer outlines the hegemonic ambitions of
the Iranian regime, and the centrality of Lebanon to that endeavor. Baer‘s theory is that
Iran will build a network of organizations such as Hezbollah in seeking to advance
Iranian interests. These hegemonic aspirations on the part of Iran, and Lebanon‘s
specific role in those plans, will be discussed in great length in the next chapter. It is
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worth noting at this point however that Iran views its relationship with Hezbollah as the
first step in building that network of relationships.84 As Baer states:
[t]he Lebanon war is Iran‘s blueprint for its new empire, fought for and held by
proxies: the first Middle Eastern empire since the Ottomans, a superpower, as the
Iranians intend to demonstrate to the world. 85
The Iranians realized successes with the Israeli pull-out from Lebanon in 2000, but also
more recently in Hezbollah‘s military victory in 2006.86 These successes clearly impact
the strategic environment for the United States in that Iran now has a tested means
through which to influence affairs in its client states despite tremendous pressure from
both the United States and Israel. As the next chapter will discuss, the stakes for Iran
implementing this hegemonic network extend far beyond Lebanon, and can have
implications on critical U.S. interests elsewhere in the region.
In summation, the post-2006 strategic environment for the United States can be
categorized by the strategic weakening of Israel due to this last in a string of military
failures in Lebanon. Furthermore, there was a weakening of the Lebanese central
government relative to Hezbollah and the strengthening of the Iranian regime and its
Lebanese proxy.
What Policies Were Pursued?
With a better understanding of the strategic environment that emerged in the
months following Israel‘s pull-out from Lebanon in 2006, one can begin to understand
what the specific interests of the United States were and what policies the U.S.
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government pursued to advance these interests. The specifics of these interests and
policies can be found in the statements made by senior State Department officials in their
testimony before Congressional committees. Specifically, we turn to the testimonies of
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch in November 2007
as well as the testimony of Mr. Welch‘s successor, Jeffrey Feltman, in July 2008. Both
of these men were speaking before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Four themes become apparent in looking at their statements, as well as other
accounts of the post-2006 era. First, they emphasize the promotion of democracy in
Lebanon. Second, they mention reinforcing Lebanese sovereignty by building a strong
Lebanese government and economy to counter Hezbollah while also ensuring the
protection of Lebanese sovereignty by securing the border with Syria against the
proliferation of weapons into Lebanon. Third, they stress seeking justice in the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. 87 A fourth theme that while not
substantially addressed by Welch or Feltman is significant nonetheless is maintaining the
commitment to ensure Israeli national security. The pursuit of these four interests has
largely framed the U.S. policy toward Lebanon since 2006.
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Promoting Democratization
The interest of promoting democracy in Lebanon stems from the threat posed by
the new strategic realities of a weakened Lebanese government and the empowered roles
of Syria and Iran due to Hezbollah‘s victory. In terms of democratization, the United
States has called for implementation of the provisions of UNSC Resolutions 1559 and
1701. Resolution 1559 specifically offers:
[…] support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon‘s upcoming
presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised
without foreign interference or influence [.]88
In his statement, Welch implies that foreign interference from Syria could perhaps be
curbed if free presidential elections were to take place in Lebanon. 89 Aside from simply
stating the importance of promoting democracy through elections and Lebanon‘s
obligations under Resolution 1559, the Bush Administration also, ―[…] approved a ban
against travel to the United States of any persons who are responsible for policies and
actions that threaten Lebanon‘s sovereignty and democracy.‖90 Moreover, the Treasury
Department under the Bush Administration later froze the property of the same types of
agitators delineated in the travel ban.91
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One can deduce that these policies were a response to the new strategic
environment created by Hezbollah‘s infringement upon Lebanon‘s democracy. A war
had been launched in 2006 that was not executed by the Lebanese government, but rather
by a militant organization striving to gain the return of Lebanese held captive in Israel,
and also to showcase their power.92 This clearly undermined the democratic process in
Lebanon. Furthermore, Lebanon suffered in the months following the 2006 war from the
withdrawal of Shia public servants from cabinet positions. Welch also recalls that in the
months prior to the war, assassinations hampered the functioning of the Lebanese
government.93 In a zero-sum game between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah,
these measures could be seen as a means of increasing the power of the Lebanese
government, and thus decreasing the power of Hezbollah.
Building a Strong Lebanese Central Government and Diminishing the Power of
Hezbollah
A second related interest to that of promoting democracy involves building a
strong Lebanese central government. Welch cited the, ―[…] significant economic,
military and diplomatic assistance […]‖ that was offered under the Bush
Administration.94 According to the Department of State‘s FY2011 Budget Justification,
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) received $186,400,000 from the
United States in FY2009. By FY2010, the enacted amount increased to $210,914,000,
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and the FY2011 amount increased further to $212,000,000.95 This is one of the largest
allocations given to a U.S.-backed international peacekeeping activity. 96 Economic
assistance is also evident in a huge surge in U.S. support through the Economic Support
Fund (ESF). Recent State Department budget documents indicate that ESF allocations
for Lebanon have increased from an actual allocation of $34,794,000 in FY200497 to a
requested $109,000,000 for FY2011.98
Not only have the allocation levels been increasing, but the nature of the support
has also changed to become more in tune with the strategic objectives of the assistance.
For example, in the FY2006 Function 150 Report, the ESF allocation for Lebanon was
intended ―[…] to promote economic growth and trade reform; continue good governance
programs; protect the environment; and support the four American Educational
Institutions in Lebanon.‖99 By the FY2008 report, the nature of the support had changed
completely. Rather than prioritizing economic programs and American institutions, the
support was geared toward:
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[…] support[ing] Lebanon‘s democratic traditions by establishing credible,
transparent governing institutions, fostering human rights, supporting civil society
organizations, and improving educational and economic opportunities among the
Lebanese people. Certain funds will be targeted to securing Lebanon‘s water
resources, reducing the ability of Hizbollah to make water an issue that divides
the populace and erodes support for the current Government.100
This rhetoric suggests that these funds are intended to advance the aforementioned
interests of promoting the power of the central government, while at the same time
diminishing the power of Hezbollah. Furthermore, the support appears to be geared
toward reinforcing Lebanese democracy, which would in theory reduce the influence of
foreign powers such as Syria and Iran. Also, by improving water access, fostering the
growth of civil society and advancing the state of education and the economy, the United
States would be working to confront the very social problems that Hezbollah could
capitalize on to recruit supporters.
Another area of support mentioned by Welch involves military assistance. One
channel of support has been Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The initial allocation for
FY2006 requested by the Bush Administration was a mere $1,000,000.101 In the wake of
the war however, these allocations saw a surge similar to that seen in the ESF. By
FY2008, the FMF request for Lebanon was $220,000,000; support which, according the
State Department, would be used to help ensure Lebanese compliance with UNSC
Resolution 1701 through providing the means to fulfill their material and training
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requirements.102 Subsequent FMF levels have been well above that of the initial FY2006
level of $1,000,000.103 The FY2011 request for FMF is $100,000,000 in support for
Lebanon.104
Other forms of security assistance offered to the Lebanese government have taken
the form of International Military Education and Training (IMET). In FY2005, the actual
amount of funds committed to Lebanon was some $809,000.105 Initial FY2006 requests
were a mere $700,000,106 yet by FY2008, $1,477,000 had been spent on Lebanon for
IMET.107 The FY2011 request for IMET assistance to Lebanon is reported as being
$2,500,000.108
The basis for this substantial material and training support to the Lebanese
government was justified by the Bush Administration as having been in the interest of
reinforcing the power of the Lebanese government relative to Hezbollah. Feltman made
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this interest clear in his statement before the House subcommittee, in which he cited his
concern over, ―[…] Hezbollah‘s challenge to Lebanon‘s state institutions [specifically the
military and telecommunications].‖109
The U.S. policy of reinforcing Lebanese sovereignty does not stop with providing
material and training assistance to the Lebanese government. In addition to these
programs, the United States has taken measures to ensure that materials such as weapons
do not cross Lebanon‘s borders, particularly from Syria. UNSC Resolution 1701, passed
after the war, prohibits the transfer of weapons ―[…] to any entity or individual in
Lebanon […].‖110 Welch reiterates the support of the United States toward this end,
recalling efforts made to garner international support to help guard the Lebanese border
from weapons smuggling. 111 Feltman also stressed the importance of border security a
year later in 2008, stating that the issue of weapons coming across the border still
persisted and merited action. 112 In fact, some of the military assistance provided by the
United States has been destined to promote border security and prevent arms trafficking
across the border from Syria. Support has been provided to Lebanon‘s Internal Security
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Forces (ISF) for use in securing the border. This support has included training, gear, and
some 360 vehicles as of a 2009 report.113
Without weapons flowing from Syria into Lebanon, the United States may be able
to advance its goal of ultimately disarming Hezbollah by preventing weapons from
reaching the organization. UNSC Resolution 1701 requires that the government of
Lebanon be the only armed entity within the republic. 114 Welch again emphasizes this
key provision, stating a critical position of the United States. He points out that while
Hezbollah‘s participation within Lebanon‘s political system would be viewed as
acceptable by the United States, its existence as an armed militant organization is
completely intolerable. 115
The significance of this statement will be revisited when policy recommendations
are discussed in Chapter Four. At this point though, it is necessary to realize that from
the policy perspective of the United States, Hezbollah‘s existence as an armed militant
organization is seen as a major obstacle to Lebanese stability. This U.S. position has
been translated into policy through the disarmament provisions of UNSC Resolution
1701, Feltman‘s strong anti-armed-Hezbollah rhetoric, the assistance to support Lebanese
border security and the economic and military assistance programs. This assistance
would theoretically strengthen the Lebanese military and improve the economic
conditions in the country, making militancy less appealing to Lebanese citizens.
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It is important to mention that the decision taken by the international community
to marginalize Hezbollah‘s power following the summer of 2006 was not the only
alternative open at the time. Cathy Sultan states that:
[i]n the aftermath of the war, a number of possible approaches [for dealing with
Hezbollah] were proposed, ranging from straight disarmament to the integration
of Hezbollah forces into the national defense structure as a sort of civil defense
league or national guard.116
As has been made clear by the subsequent U.S. policy position following the war, and by
the UNSC Resolution passed with American support, a decision was made to choose
straight disarmament of Hezbollah over other alternatives.
The United States also took more drastic measures to offset Hezbollah‘s power in
Lebanon following the war. Cathy Sultan details a program supported by the Bush
Administration, Saad Hariri, and the Saudi Arabian Government. The Bush
Administration pursued a policy of arranging Saudi support for Fatah al-Islam, an
extremist group whose leadership had links to al-Qaeda. It was believed that support for
this Sunni group could balance out the power of Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon. This was
part of a broader strategy to balance Hezbollah‘s power, and by extension Syrian and
Iranian power, in the country.117
Other more ambitious U.S. policy goals intended to stabilize Lebanon included
plans to establish a joint U.S. and international military presence within the country.
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While these plans never materialized, Cathy Sultan describes talks over the possibility of
creating a U.S./NATO air force base in Lebanon, near the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.118
Another Lebanese sovereignty issue that has been incorporated into U.S. policy
since 2006 has been the issue of the Shebaa Farms. This issue is also brought up in the
post-war UNSC Resolution 1701, in which the UNSC seeks the ―[…] delineation of the
international borders of Lebanon [names Shebaa Farms][.]‖119 Feltman points out how
the Bush Administration made solving this border problem a priority, believing that
solving it could help foster more peaceful Lebanese, Syrian and Israeli relations. 120
Feltman is not alone in his belief that solving the Shebaa Farms border issue could have a
significant impact on Lebanese security. Paul Salem posits that convincing Hezbollah to
give up their weapons will be more tenable if, among other things, the United Nations
took authority over the Shebaa Farms. 121
Investigating the Assassination of Rafik Hariri
A third policy issue of importance to the United States has been efforts to bring
justice to those behind the 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri. Welch highlights the fact that, in addition to helping garner international
support for the investigative tribunal, the United States provided some $5,000,000 to help
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launch it.122 It is no surprise that the United States would be interested in creating an
international body that would look into who was behind the assassination. It is clear that
the results of the investigation could detract from Hezbollah‘s power.
David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests that if
responsibility is placed on Hezbollah for the attack, it would have a deleterious impact on
the organization‘s power, even if legal action is not taken against the organization or its
members. 123 Presumably, such damage could come in the form of decreased legitimacy
for Hezbollah, both in Lebanon and internationally. This result could play to the
advantage of the Lebanese government in the power struggle between it and Hezbollah.
Ensuring Israeli National Security
As has been stated, one of the strategic implications of the 2006 war was Israel‘s
withdrawal from Lebanon without having met some of its most important security
objectives, as well as the political and strategic victories of Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. At
the same time that the United States was working to strengthen the Lebanese government,
it was also taking steps to safeguard Israeli security against Hezbollah. One aspect of this
policy was an increase in U.S. military assistance. A ten-year, $30.4 billion package was
offered to Israel to complement then yearly levels of over $3 billion.124
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Several reports also suggest that U.S. interests in Israeli national security may be
behind the decisions taken by policymakers to avoid providing more substantial military
support to the Lebanese government. A report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies indicates that:
[t]he U.S. has had reservations about augmenting the LAF‘s [Lebanese Armed
Forces] capabilities in light of Israeli interests, Hizbullah, Lebanon‘s place in the
ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict and the overall perceived instability and weakness
of Lebanon from political and security standpoints. 125
Moreover, members of the U.S. Congress have shown concern over the past year
regarding the possible use of force by Lebanon‘s military against Israel. 126 These fears
came to fruition in August 2010 when Lebanese forces opened fire on and killed an
Israeli military officer at the border.127
Conclusion
These four goals have set the broad framework for U.S. policy toward Lebanon
since the 2006 conflict. With these policies delineated, one can now begin to assess the
impact that Iranian and Syrian policy has had on the interests of the United States.
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Chapter Three – Threats From Iran and Syria
Introduction
For much of Lebanese history, the foreign policies of Syria and Iran have weighed
heavily on political, social and economic developments within Lebanon. In the case of
Syria, the relationship between the government in Damascus and Beirut has changed
from one of a sovereign, to an occupier and then a hegemon. In the case of Iran, post1979 political developments in that country have prompted a close relationship between
the Shia Islamic Republic, and the Lebanese Shia population, which remains ensconced
in conflict with the Israeli state. This chapter will highlight the threats posed to American
interests in Lebanon by Syria and Iran.
Given the conceptualization of this project as delineated in the first chapter,
Iranian and Syrian foreign policy can be viewed as independent variables impacting
stability within Lebanon. By assessing the impact that these variables currently have and
may have in the future on U.S. interests, we can gain a better perspective on how the
United States should craft a new policy.
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon
To adequately grasp the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and how Syria and Iran are
able to shape developments through this group, it is important to understand the context
of why the organization‘s appeal has emerged and grown over time, and how Iran and
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Syria have been able to capitalize on that appeal. This appeal can best be understood in
terms of two areas: community outreach and Lebanese national security.
The Appeal of Hezbollah: Community Outreach
In a country where the government is weak, people may turn to within their own
community in looking for power to be exercised. This phenomenon, as occurred in
Lebanon, is discussed by Mehran Kamrava, who states that:
[i]n Lebanon, to cite an extreme example, the atrophy of the state in the late 1970s
and early 1980s resulted in a dramatic heightening of such primordial forces as
sectarianism and clannishness to the extent that the average Lebanese citizen was
plagued by a ‗confessional mind.‘128
In terms of community outreach, Mohamad Bazi of the Council on Foreign Relations
explains that dating back to the 1960s, the Lebanese government has fallen short of
meeting the needs of Shia within the country. 129 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr highlights
these governmental shortcomings, stating that:
[a]s for public services and institutions, the state provided few schools or
hospitals in the Shi‘ite areas, while the contents of the history textbooks seemed
rather alien because they did not even partially represent Shi‘ite aspirations and
national narratives.130
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As a response to this need for a Shia educational system, efforts have been made to
establish Shia schools within these neglected communities, and it is indicated by ShaeryEisenlohr that at least some of these schools are ―Hizbullah-run.‖131
Hezbollah in particular has been able to capitalize on the government neglect of
the Shia population in that, ―[i]t created a dependency and social service network that
guaranteed its dominance.‖132 The concept of Shia organizations in Lebanon predates the
establishment of Hezbollah. For example, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a Shiite
religious leader, worked as a leader and fundraiser for organizations such as the Imam
Khu‘i Orphanage and Bahman Hospital, both of which eventually came under the
umbrella of his Benevolent Charity Society. 133 Specific services offered by Hezbollah
consist, ―[…] of social services to its constituents that include construction companies,
schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and micro-finance initiatives […].‖134 It is believed that
as much as an annual $100 million of the financing for these services come from the
Islamic Republic. 135
It is reported that in the wake of the 2006 war, some $1 billion in Iranian capital
had been invested by Hezbollah in development and reconstruction initiatives. 136 In the
realm of national security regarding Israel, and in terms of providing for Shia in Lebanon,
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Hezbollah has made itself a useful component of Lebanon‘s political, economic and
security apparatus.
The Appeal of Hezbollah: Lebanese National Security
Hezbollah‘s presence in Lebanese politics and society can also be understood in
terms of addressing Lebanese national security. The organization‘s very genesis came
shortly after Israeli troops entered Lebanon in the early 1980s. 137 As Israeli forces moved
into Lebanon in 1982 for the second time in four years, several Lebanese entities took up
arms against the Israeli military, including Hezbollah. Hezbollah was not only
responsible for significant attacks against the Israelis such as the 1982 Tyre suicide carbombing, but it took ownership in a majority of these strikes against Israeli forces. 138
During the Israeli invasion in the 1980s, Lebanon‘s Shia became the backbone of the
armed opposition. According to Mohamad Bazi, ―[t]he Shiites turned out to be more
formidable enemies of Israel than the PLO.‖139 Paul Salem suggests that Hezbollah
perceives itself as an entity that is necessary due to Lebanon‘s military incapacities. He
states, ―Hezbollah has pointed to the weaknesses of the Lebanese army and state in the
past to justify its own existence.‖ 140
The suspected growth in Hezbollah‘s rocket and missile capabilities as mentioned
earlier are proof of the premium that Hezbollah puts on its role as a security organization.
Also worth noting are the steps taken by Hezbollah to focus its militarism in the south on
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Israel. While Hezbollah engaged in the targeting of non-Israelis during the 1980s with
the killing of an American serviceman during the TWA flight 847 hijacking in 1985,141
there is evidence to show that today Hezbollah is principally concerned with focusing its
security prerogatives on the Israeli occupation. For one, the organization has accepted
the part of UNSC Resolution 1701 which stipulates a UNIFIL presence in south Lebanon,
and has even accepted the fact that its members ―may be detained and disarmed‖ if
caught with weapons. 142 Moreover, Hezbollah made clear in August 2006 that its arsenal
was strictly for the means of confronting Israel and not for internal use within
Lebanon.143 These developments may suggest a more focused security perspective of the
organization. However, the group‘s outside links are a cause for concern, and can have a
major impact on Hezbollah‘s future operations.
Hezbollah’s International Links
Hezbollah‘s connections with Iran and Syria can best be understood in terms of
political/economic and military material connections. Political connections between Iran
and Hezbollah can be seen in the highest levels of leadership within the organization.
Both Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps are believed to have connections to the preeminent decision making
apparatus within Hezbollah, known as the Majlis al-Shura. 144 These political connections
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can be viewed in the framework for Iranian hegemony outlined by Robert Baer. He notes
that the successes yielded by Iran‘s support for Hezbollah, namely the 2000 withdrawal
of Israeli forces out of Lebanon, has proven to the Iranian leadership that developing
connections to Shia in the Arab World can provide Iran with the means to advance its
foreign policy goal of regional hegemony. 145
Iran‘s attempts at hegemony in Lebanon have become all the more salient since
the summer 2010. As the United States has started to debate the discontinuation of its
assistance program to Lebanon, Iran is seeking to take advantage of the situation and the
possible deterioration of U.S. support. Following a U.S. moratorium on military
assistance in August 2010, the Iranian government suggested that it would provide
assistance in light of the U.S. reneging on its commitment to Lebanese security. Iran was
also reported in October 2010 to be close to finalizing a loan worth $450 million to
Lebanon in support of development initiatives, such as, ―[…] electricity and water
projects […].‖146
Another form of Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon is that of military
assistance to both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. Various reports suggest that
material assistance to Hezbollah from these countries has been stepped-up in the years
following the 2006 war. Hezbollah is reported to hold ―[…] as many as 45,000 rockets –
at least three times as many as it had in the summer of 2006 […].‖147 There are also
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reports of alleged SCUD missile transfers between Syria and Hezbollah. 148 A 2010
report by the United Nations sheds light on these allegations, indicating that while the
Lebanese government is unaware of any violations of illegal weapons transfers, the
Israeli government has claimed that Hezbollah controls some ―55,000 missiles and
rockets.‖149 Furthermore, the report states that the Israeli government has indicated to the
United Nations that it believes that illegal weapons transfers between Syria and Lebanon
are taking place. However, the United Nations has been unable to confirm the reports.150
Additional assistance from Iran directly to Hezbollah has come from the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, where they ―[…] serve alongside senior Hizbullah officials,
as well as give vital technical support.‖151
One increasingly important aspect of the current discourse on Hezbollah is the
debate on whether the organization‘s institutional loyalty lies in the Lebanese state or in
Iran. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson take up this question, shedding light on a
conclusion reached by RAND analysts, which is that trends may show that Hezbollah is
seeking autonomy from Iran. Simon and Stevenson suggest that the organization will
eventually be placed in a position where it must disarm. They argue that the Lebanese
people have reacted negatively to past Hezbollah acts to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, namely the violence in May 2008 over a standoff between Hezbollah and the
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Lebanese government and reports of serious financial corruption within the group that
had a negative impact on their Shia constituents. The authors posit that in the wake of
these public relations problems amongst the Lebanese populace, Hezbollah may make a
move away from militancy. 152
Lebanese Nationalism and Hezbollah
To better understand the question of Hezbollah‘s autonomy in its relationship
with Iran and Syria, one must look at trends in Shiite nationalism within Lebanon. As
argued by Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, a major part of Lebanese political life is a sense
of religious nationalism. She argues:
[i]n the context of Lebanese political traditions, visions of the Lebanese nation
have often taken the shape of a nationalism highlighting religious belonging. In
fact, belonging to a religious community is the only legitimate way of being part
of the Lebanese nation.153
Each religious sect within Lebanon therefore seeks power vis-à-vis the other sects in
framing the country‘s society in a non-exclusive manner. 154
From ―the 1960s‖ onward, there has been a Shiite nationalist movement in
Lebanon that seeks to, ―[…] break with the dominant national narrative of Maronite
Lebanon, with which most of them [Shia in Lebanon] do not identify […].‖ 155 For
example, following the civil war, the rebuilding of Beirut at the hands of Rafik Hariri was
conducted, according to Shaery-Eisenlohr, in the Sunni image of creating a vibrant
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commercial center in the city; an image that the country‘s Shia could not relate to and
were thus ostracized from.156
In this context, Iran‘s support to Shia is a function of the need to advance
sectarian nationalist goals. 157 Historically, there is evidence that nationalism in Lebanon
has at times trumped Shia ties to Iran. One case that helps illustrate this point is the issue
of Iranian education in Lebanon, particularly in terms of the instruction of Farsi.
In the early 1960s, Farsi lessons received a hostile reception amongst the Shia
community in Lebanon, because the language was associated with a regime in Tehran
that stood aligned with Israel and against Pan-Arabism. Shaery-Eisenlohr mentions how
students rose up to these efforts to teach Farsi by not attending classes, and even resorting
to violence against an instructor. Shaery-Eisenlohr‘s assessment also suggests that as
recent as the early 2000s, the promotion of the Iranian language is still not embraced even
within Shia schools. She mentions specifically schools where pupil‘s families are linked
to Hezbollah or the resistance in some way. At these schools, the instruction of Farsi is
not popular, and the families perceive Farsi to be unimportant relative to, ―[…] English
and French, which the parents consider highly relevant for their children‘s future.‖158 It
would appear that despite the religious connection to Iran, Arab and Lebanese nationalist
ties transcend Shia unity. This suggests that Lebanese Shia autonomy from Iran may not
be a far-fetched political possibility.
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Evidence also exists to suggest that Hezbollah has a substantial degree of political
autonomy from Iran and Syria dating back to the 2006 war. It is suggested by Cathy
Sultan that the ultimate decision to execute the kidnapping that prompted the war was
made by Hezbollah, and that Iran and Syria essentially had to go along for the ride after
the fact. She cites sources from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Israeli government to back this claim. 159 Once the war commenced, it also appears that
the Hezbollah mission was more grounded in Lebanese rather than Iranian policy. In an
interview she conducted with a member of Hezbollah involved in the 2006 war, it
becomes apparent that there is a perception within Hezbollah that the war was primarily
oriented toward defending Lebanon. Iranian interests did not even surface as an issue in
the account of the interview. While this interview was conducted with one individual
among many in Hezbollah, the rhetoric used suggests that these opinions were
representative of not only the interviewee, but of a broader sampling of those who fought
in the war.160
A June 2010 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies also
suggests that Hezbollah might be less inclined in the future to act in accord with Iranian
interests, particularly with regards to any confrontation with Israel. The report argues
that the political progress made by Hezbollah and the coalition that has been built with
certain Lebanese Christians could lead the Hezbollah leadership to exercise reluctance
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before engaging Israel with violence yet again, even if pressured to do so by Iran or
Syria.161
While Iranian influence in Lebanon from the 1980s to 2010 may have been
focused on capitalizing on the shortcomings of the Lebanese government, Iran now finds
itself able to benefit from not only the shortcomings of the government in Beirut, but also
the government in Washington. While it may be debatable how loyal Hezbollah is to
either Lebanon or Iran, the fact of the matter is that the need for an organization like
Hezbollah and for foreign investment exists now just as it did two and a half decades ago.
It would appear that there are significant differences in perceptions between
Tehran and Hezbollah on the latter‘s strategic role in the broader picture of Middle
Eastern politics. To Tehran, Hezbollah is a means through which the Iranian government
can exercise hegemony in the region. To Hezbollah, it appears there is a strategic culture
that has deeper roots in a unique type of Lebanese nationalism than toward loyalty to
Tehran. However, regardless of what Hezbollah perceives its own role to be, the inflows
of weaponry since 2006 (presumably from Iran and Syria), the capital flows from Iran to
Lebanon and the political connections between Iran and Lebanon, may make it difficult
in the future for Hezbollah to ignore Tehran.
Threats to U.S. interests as posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Lebanon are
threefold. First, the enhancements in Hezbollah‘s weapons capabilities are highly
disturbing, and run counter to the U.S. interests of degenerating Hezbollah‘s military
power, ensuring compliance with UNSC Resolutions and protecting Israel. Second, the
events of the past year suggest Iran is prepared to provide Lebanon with extensive
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developmental and military assistance. Last, the hegemony-through-proxy model
illustrated by Baer suggests that the empowerment of Hezbollah that has taken place
since 2006 could spark similar Iranian-proxy relationships throughout the Middle East
with the end goal of advancing Iranian regional hegemony.
Ambassador Hill explained the importance of Lebanon to the Iranian government:
―For them [Iran] a key element of it is to strengthen Shia or to politicize Shia and
strengthen them wherever possible. And I think Lebanon is a key element in that strategy
with Hezbollah.‖162 As links between Iran and both Hezbollah and the Lebanese
government grow in an effort to advance this strategy, it will become increasingly
difficult for Hezbollah to exercise autonomy as it has in the past. A recent report citing
an Israeli allegation that Hezbollah is providing training support to Hamas along with
Iran163 suggests, if true, that Hezbollah may still be viewed in Tehran as an Iranian proxy,
with costly implications for the United States.
Major Obstacles to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process
Syria factors significantly into many of the interests and goals of the United States
in Lebanon. These interests include securing the Syrian-Lebanese border to both
reinforce Lebanese sovereignty and to prevent illegal weapons transfers, preventing
Syrian support for Hezbollah, making progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict and building
more substantial relations between the governments in Beirut and Damascus. The
advancement of these interests is difficult because the Iranian government continues to
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exercise power over the government in Syria. This section will specify several aspects of
the Syrian-Iranian relationship which could pose a threat to advancing U.S. interests not
only in Lebanon, but in the broader region.
Syria currently finds itself in a unique position due to its complex relationship
with Iran. The Iranian state is largely isolated, in a position of ―strategic loneliness.‖164
Perhaps the closest substantial relationship that Iran has is with Syria. However, as Ray
Takeyh points out, ―[…] the ties between the two states are at best an alliance of
convenience based on shared fears and apprehensions.‖165 Such common ground
between Iran and Syria, Takeyh argues, includes the threat posed by Israel. For both
countries, Hezbollah plays an essential role as an antagonizing force against Israel. 166 At
the same time however, there are points of contention between the two states, particularly
with regards to how each perceives Hezbollah‘s specific role in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and over what the future shape of Iraqi politics will be. 167 Given the complexities of this
relationship, it is entirely possible that Iran can leverage both its common ground with
Syria as well as its rising political power to influence Syria‘s position on critical U.S.
interests.
One means through which Iran can impact Syrian policy is by influencing the
situation in Iraq so as to bring about negative political repercussions in Syria. The role of
Iran in the post-Saddam, post-American occupation Iraq cannot be overstated. A recent
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intelligence report by STRATFOR indicates that in the event that U.S. troops withdraw
from Iraq by 2012, as they are slated to do, the Iranian government will find it in its
interest to continue tamper in Iraqi affairs. This would ensure that Iraq does not pose the
same threat to Iranian national security as it did under the leadership of former President
Saddam Hussein. Iran can influence Gulf developments in many ways, including through
its ability to, ―[…] covertly support pro-Iranian forces in the region, destabilizing existing
regimes.‖168 Robert Baer points to examples of past instances of such influence,
particularly Iranian involvement in Iraq‘s key political parties. 169 It has even been
suggested that Iranian entities have penetrated the coveted Iraqi oil industry by having
―looted‖ oil in south Iraq.170 In short, Iran is fully capable of exercising power within
Iraq.
While such developments have been taking place in Iraq and do not have a direct
impact on Lebanon, it is not difficult to see how enhanced Iranian influence in Iraq could
be used as a tool to pressure Syria to adopt a position in Lebanese relations and the peace
process that is counter to the interests of the United States. One powerful tool by which
Syria is affected is through the Kurdish issue. The Kurds account for some 8% of the
population of Syria and Iran could use the Kurds as a political weapon, particularly in
Iraq.171 If Iran were to support Kurdish armed movements, 172 the consequences could be
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twofold for Syria. One, given the proximity of the Kurdish areas in Iraq to Syria, it could
cause a migration of refugees fleeing the fighting from Iraq to Syria (see Figure 5 in
Appendix B). Second, any armed movement in Iraq could conceivably cross Iraq‘s
borders and affect Syria‘s Kurds. Both scenarios would create turmoil for the
government in Damascus.
Aside from the Kurdish issue, Iran can also influence Syria through Syrian trade
ties with Iraq. Accounting for just over 30% of Syria‘s exports, Iraq is the largest
importer of Syrian exports.173 Iran‘s political connections in Baghdad have already been
mentioned, and if these pro-Iranian elements were to enjoy enough power, they could
perhaps seek to employ economic pressure on Syria by imposing trade restrictions against
Syrian exports to Iraq. The proposed free trade agreement with Syria, 174 if approved, will
certainly help in providing Syria with other lucrative export markets, and in the longterm, could potentially make Syria‘s exporters less dependent on a country where Iran
wields economic and political power.
More direct economic links between Iran and Syria are also starting to take hold.
The two countries are anticipated to enter contract on a natural gas pipeline that will
deliver five million cubic meters a day from Iran to Syria. 175 A second pipeline linking
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Iran, Iraq and Syria and capable of accommodating 20 million cubic meters a day should
be operational in 2015.176 These developments show that aside from the issues
surrounding the Iran-Iraq-Syria nexus, Syria‘s economic dependence on Iran could also
enhance Iran‘s power in Lebanon by making it more difficult for Syria to insulate
Lebanon from Iranian influence.
The point of highlighting this Iran-Iraq-Syria nexus is to shed light on the
difficulties Syria faces in deviating from the Iranian course with regards to the ArabIsraeli conflict and Hezbollah. These difficulties will likely continue in the future. The
stakes are simply too high for Syria politically and economically to turn a cold shoulder
to Iran. The implication of this reality for Lebanon is that it can become exceedingly
difficult for Syria to reach a compromise with Israel so long as Iran seeks to maintain the
status-quo. Furthermore, to compound the power that Iran holds over Syria via Iraq,
there is the fact that while Syria and Iran both play roles in supporting Hezbollah, the
influence of Iran over Hezbollah has been far greater than Syria‘s since the Lebanese
civil war.177 While Syria may not agree with the non-secular Iranian vision of the
resistance, 178 the successes of the resistance while Iran was largely at the helm has made
it difficult for Syria to change Hezbollah‘s course.179
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The Threat of the Iranian Nuclear Program
While the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran does not pose a direct threat to
Lebanon or to U.S. interests in that country, an Iranian nuclear arsenal, or even continued
progress toward obtaining such an arsenal, poses numerous threats to Lebanese stability.
The Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons is by no means a recent phenomenon, and early
efforts towards developing the technology necessary for a nuclear weapon date back to
the time of the Shah. The 1990s saw a resurrection of this effort with assistance from
Russia, and by the early 2000s, Iran‘s uranium enrichment capabilities became apparent
to the United States.180
Preventative Strikes Leading to War
As the international community determines how to respond to Iran‘s nuclear
weapons program, one option that is often discussed is the possibility of an Israeli
airstrike against Iran‘s nuclear infrastructure. Israel has a precedent of conducting such
actions, having launched strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria. It is also
worth noting that national security was a major factor in Benjamin Netanyahu‘s election
as Prime Minister.181 According to Brent Talbot, the Iranian regime may respond to an
Israeli attack through the following: ―[w]ith influence over both Hamas and Hizballah,
Iran would likely use its proxies to launch retribution attacks.‖182 Talbot is not alone in
concluding that Hezbollah can be mobilized in the wake of an Israeli attack against Iran.
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Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic discusses the possibility of Hezbollah using its weapons
against Israel following an Israeli attack on Iran, 183 thus turning Lebanon into a key
center of gravity in an Israeli-Iranian conflict.
Furthermore, if either Israel or the United States strikes Iran‘s nuclear program,
―[…] an attack could backfire […] and trigger a costly retaliation against the United
States and U.S. allies in the Middle East.‖184 This concern is widespread within the
academic community and followers of Middle East affairs that U.S. interests in a state
like Lebanon could become jeopardized should action be taken against Iran‘s nuclear
program.
The risks of an Iranian retaliation are serious, and would pose major risks to U.S.
interests in Lebanon as Lebanese sovereignty will be threatened in a war with Israel.
Furthermore, Israel‘s democracy will fail to flourish, and Lebanon‘s Shia will continue to
militarize and distrust Israel. Lastly, the U.S. interest of Israeli national security will
undoubtedly be threatened as Hezbollah strikes Israel. There are two precedents that
make the dangers of such a scenario playing out all the more likely. One is Israel‘s
willingness to launch airstrikes against potentially threatening weapons programs in the
region. A second involves the willingness of Hezbollah to fight Israel, as it did in the
summer of 2006. This historical record suggests that should Israel decide that a strike
against Iran is essential for its own national security, it is highly likely that Lebanon will
find itself yet again ensconced in war.
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Nuclear Threats Post-Weaponization
As Iran continues work on its nuclear program, it becomes more likely that the
Islamic Republic will eventually achieve nuclear weapons capabilities. The longer this
program lasts, the more likely they will be to make a bomb due to political inertia. Ray
Takeyh points out:
[a]s India and Pakistan demonstrated, once a nuclear program matures, it attracts
political patrons invoking national prestige, military officers attracted to the
weapons of awesome power, and a scientific establishment seeking to perpetuate
a program that generates profits and jobs.185
While it is up for debate whether or not Iran would dare to use a nuclear weapon once
they have the capability, what is certain is that an Iranian nuclear weapon would
safeguard Iran‘s involvement in Lebanon by offering an added level of security against
U.S. or Israeli retaliation. It could be more assertive and provide more material and
financial support for Hezbollah, increasing Iranian political hegemony over Lebanon and
a further proliferation of anti-Israeli sentiment throughout the region. As Takeyh posits,
―[a] presumptive nuclear capability would grant Iran a greater ability to assert its interests
and press it claims.‖186
Takeyh is not alone in reaching this conclusion. Edelman et al also state that U.S.
priorities in the Middle East would be jeopardized by an Iranian nuclear armament as Iran
grows more audacious.187 Given the established framework of Iranian involvement in
Lebanon and the invested Iranian stake in the Hezbollah model as discussed earlier in this
chapter, it is clear that Iran‘s post-nuclear pursuits would undoubtedly play out in
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Lebanon. This effect of politically empowering Iran at the expense of the United States
will be heightened as Israel and Iran find themselves in the midst of a nuclear arms race.
Iran will increase its number of nuclear weapons to effectively compete with Israel, and
as Iran gains more weapons, it will grow bolder in its international endeavors. 188
Another unfortunate consequence that may come about from the nuclear
weaponization of Iran involves the impact it will have on the ability of the United States
to advance its interests in the region. Edleman et al posit that other states in the region
will perceive the nuclear weaponization of Iran as the result of an inability of the United
States to exercise power in the region. They state, ―[i]f the United States cannot prevent
a conventionally armed Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, its partners in the Middle
East will almost certainly question its willingness to stand up to a nuclear-armed Iran.‖189
This reality could greatly hinder the ability of the United States to advance its interests in
Lebanon, particularly regarding multilateral engagements with Israel and Syria, as well as
interactions with the Lebanese government itself. As will be elaborated on in Chapter
Five, the U.S. engagement of Syria and Israel will be key in brokering stability in
Lebanon.
With regards to Israel, the United States will need to convince Jerusalem that
withdrawing from the Shebaa Farms and refraining from future military involvement in
southern Lebanon is essential to Israeli security. The United States will also need to
engage the Syrian government to not only clarify national boundaries as discussed by the
State Department testimonies before Congress mentioned in Chapter Three, but also by
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ensuring that the anti-weapons trafficking provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701 are
enforced in the future. If the United States cannot succeed in preventing nuclear
proliferation to what it perceives as a threatening state, governments in Jerusalem and
Damascus may be less inclined to work with the United States in advancing prerogatives
in Lebanon; they may very well start to call the U.S. commitment to regional security
into question.
Conclusion
The influence of Iran in Lebanon has become substantially stronger than that of
Syria. In fact, Iran seems to have the power not only to impact developments in Beirut,
but also in Damascus.
While Shiite Lebanese Nationalism may be a historically significant phenomenon
in Lebanese society, the growing links between Iran and Lebanon and the increasing
power of Iran in the Iran-Syria-Lebanon nexus may make it difficult for Hezbollah to
exercise autonomy in terms of seeking a less militarized role in Lebanese society.
American interests of promoting a strong Lebanese government, reinforcing Lebanese
sovereignty and advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process are jeopardized by this new
reality. However, the difference in perceptions between Tehran and the Hezbollah
leadership on the organization‘s role in Lebanon could provide a prime opportunity for
the United States to influence the situation by helping Lebanon and its government grow
less dependent on an Iranian regime that does not have Lebanese national interests in
mind. These policies will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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Chapter Four – Outputs Analysis of U.S. Policy Since 2006
Introduction
The previous two chapters have illuminated the strategic priorities of the United
States following the 2006 war, the concrete policies that came out of those priorities and
the impact that Syrian and Iranian policies have had on reinforcing threats to U.S.
interests. This chapter will present an outputs analysis of the U.S. policy since 2006 by
determining the extent of American success in advancing the four objectives delineated in
Chapter Two. These objectives are the promotion of democracy, the reinforcement of
Lebanese sovereignty, the seeking of justice in the assassination of former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri and advancing Israeli national security.
Measuring the Success of the Post-2006 Policies
Promotion of Democracy
It is in the policy goal of promoting Lebanese democracy that the United States
has had perhaps the most success since 2006. Free presidential elections as supported by
the United States and the international community did in fact come to fruition. In the
spring of 2008, Michel Suleiman was elected by the Lebanese Parliament to be the
country‘s president. Suleiman‘s election came after 19 tries to hold a presidential

65

election in Lebanon in the midst of deep political factionalization between the coalition
backed by Hezbollah, and the country‘s more moderate coalition. 190
Further parliamentary elections in 2009 not only were indicative of a trend toward
democratization, but also reflected some materialization of the belief held by U.S.
policymakers that by democratizing Lebanon, foreign meddling could perhaps be
minimized. The spring 2009 elections resulted in a 71 seat victory for the March 14
coalition, while the Hezbollah coalition received only 57 seats. 191 There was also a
decrease in the number of Hezbollah coalition seats from the 59 it held as of May 2008
prior to the internationally-brokered Doha Agreement.192 The progress made indicates
the success of the U.S. policy by achieving consistent democratic elections in Lebanon,
and also in gradually scaling back the power and appeal of Hezbollah, and thus of Syria
and Iran, in the country‘s political system.
More recent events however have shown that Lebanon‘s political system may be
slipping back from the progress that had been made toward democratization and stable
leadership. This political deterioration has come mostly as a result of concerns over the
results of the United Nations inquiry into the assassination of former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri – concern voiced particularly by Hezbollah.193 When Prime Minister Saad
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Hariri refused to denounce the investigation, as Hezbollah had sought for him to do, the
organization withdrew from his government. Hezbollah then supported the man who will
become the next Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, despite concerns of his unpopularity vis-àvis Saad Hariri. 194
This current crisis has put two U.S. interests at odds: the interest of promoting
further democratization in Lebanon and the interest of reaching justice in the Hariri
assassination. The events of the past few months serve as evidence that both Lebanese
democracy and justice in the murder are two goals that are not only at odds, but now that
Hezbollah has an ally as prime minister, may never materialize.
Reinforcing Sovereignty
The United States has achieved limited success toward the goal of promoting
Lebanese sovereignty in the years following the 2006 conflict. However, upon looking
more closely at the sovereignty issue, one can easily see that this goal is still far from
reality.
Perhaps the most noteworthy success of the U.S. objective of promoting Lebanese
sovereignty can be seen in what Assistant Secretary of State Feltman describes as:
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[…] the courage that the Lebanese Army demonstrated […] when Sunni terrorists
from Nahr al-Barid refugee camp threatened Lebanon‘s security, and the
Lebanese Army took steps.195
Feltman credits the U.S. military assistance program for providing much of the material
that the LAF required to keep the peace in the camp.196 What Feltman fails to
acknowledge is that the terrorists that the LAF were fighting against in 2007 in the
refugee camp were from Fatah al-Islam. This is the same Sunni organization that the
Bush Administration worked with Saad Hariri and the Saudi Arabian government to
export to Lebanon in the interest of balancing Hezbollah. According to one account of
what transpired, Hariri‘s covert funding of Fatah al-Islam fighters became apparent to
Hezbollah, prompting Hariri to dispatch the ISF after the fighters. When the fighters took
refuge inside the refugee camp, they were confronted by the LAF, which was dispatched
by President Siniora to respond to the dilemma. It was whilst outside the camp that the
LAF was attacked by the Fatah al-Islam fighters, leading to the conflict. 197
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of this incident was that it became evident that
two tactics pursued by the United States to achieve the strategic objective of promoting
sovereignty were at odds. Supporting Fatah al-Islam and supporting the Lebanese
military were clearly at odds in this incident, and the result was a military confrontation
on Lebanese soil.
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A more substantial shortcoming of U.S. policy has been the lack of success in
securing Lebanon‘s borders, and preventing foreign weapons from entering the country.
Despite the verbiage of the post-war UNSC Resolution, the rhetoric from the State
Department and the military support offered to the Lebanese government in the interest
of securing the border, the issue of illegal weapons in Lebanon has become precipitously
worse. While some success has been made in preventing weapons transfers, such as the
fall 2009 Israeli detainment of an alleged weapons shipment en-route from Iran to
Lebanon,198 weapons shipments to Hezbollah continue.
In spring 2010, the Israeli government claimed that SCUD missiles had been
transferred between Syria and Hezbollah. An analysis from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies suggests that the SCUDS are likely the SCUD-B variant. This missile
has a range of 300 kilometers, and if based in northern Lebanon, could bring even more
of the country into confrontation with Israel in the event of another war.199
In addition to the SCUDs, Hezbollah‘s rearmament in the wake of the 2006 war
has been significant. Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic reports that the organization has,
―[…] by most intelligence estimates, as many as 45,000 rockets – at least three times as
many as it had in the summer of 2006 […].‖200 This astonishing level of rearmament
reflects a failure in the U.S. policy to ensure that weapons do not flow from hostile states
such as Syria and Iran into Lebanon.
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Seeking Justice in the Hariri Assassination
While the pursuit of justice in the wake of an event such as the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is laudable, the fact of the matter is that this
investigation, which has been supported by the United States, has had disastrous
repercussions on the Lebanese democracy and stability. At the time of this writing, the
United Nations tribunal investigating the assassination had yet to issue indictments. 201
However, the anticipation of the investigation‘s conclusions has already led the
government under Saad Hariri to end. Six years after the assassination, the tribunal has
yet to deliver justice, and it is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Moreover, there
is concern as expressed recently by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that, ―‗[t]he
absence of a functioning government in Lebanon for several months has created a power
and security vacuum of which extremist and armed groups could take advantage
[…].‘‖202 Secretary Ban is almost certainly referring to the political chaos that has
ensued in the wake of Saad Hariri‘s government losing power over the tribunal.
It can therefore be concluded that while the United States may have had good
intentions while backing this investigation, the fallout it has created has worked against
other longer-term U.S. interests in Lebanon. As of January 2011 when a statement on the
matter was released by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States still actively
support the investigation. Secretary Clinton went so far as to say, ―[t]hose who oppose
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the Tribunal seek to create a false choice between justice and stability in Lebanon; we
reject this.‖203 While this statement is an impressive showing of the U.S. commitment to
justice, it reflects ignorance on the part of the Obama Administration to the fact that the
pursuit of justice has undoubtedly caused a blow to Lebanese democracy.
Ensuring Israeli National Security
The reports suggesting a quantitative and qualitative enhancement of Hezbollah‘s
weapons capabilities reflects a failure on the part of U.S. policy to ensure the protection
of Israel, as these weapons will conceivably be used against Israel in the event of an
escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel. 204 The previous chapter illuminated two
clear trends with regards to the Israel-Lebanon security environment. First, while
Hezbollah has moderated its behavior in some regards by becoming politically active and
not antagonizing UNIFIL, it still perceives Israel as an enemy that it must arm itself
against. The failure of the United States to make progress on reaching at least minimal
progress in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process is partly to blame. As will be discussed at
greater length in the next chapter, the occupation of Lebanon by Israel and future
concerns about Israeli infringement on Lebanese sovereignty have not been conducive to
Hezbollah‘s abandoning of militancy.
Second, while Shia in Lebanon and Hezbollah in particular may perceive
themselves as being autonomous of Iran, the deepening of Hezbollah-Iranian and
Lebanese-Iranian relations may detract from the organization‘s autonomy and reinforce
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their status, as Baer sees is, as an Iranian proxy. The recent reluctance on the part of the
United States to provide continued support to the Lebanese government over the past
year has facilitated Iran‘s continued role as a major financer of security and development
initiatives in Lebanon.
A Critique of Broader U.S. Policy Shortcomings
An account of the specific measures taken by both the Bush and Obama
Administrations following the summer of 2006 indicates two trends in post-2006 U.S.
policy. First, the policy appears to be grounded in a realist approach to international
relations, at the expense of other more useful frameworks for dealing with Lebanese
stability. Second, there have been noteworthy inconsistencies in pursuing the
aforementioned policy goals, which have made the advancement of U.S. interests in the
region difficult.
A Critique of the Realist Approach
The realist paradigm in international relations assumes that states are central
actors in the international system, stresses the importance of state power, and argues that
power in itself is a zero-sum phenomenon.205 The U.S. approach to Lebanon since 2006
has, for the most part, operated within this limited paradigm of foreign policy. The
central emphasis on maximizing the power of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis
Hezbollah, Syria and Iran is an example of this. The current U.S. policy is grounded,
with some exceptions, in the belief that by arming Lebanon‘s military and by providing
resources to the government, the appeal of Hezbollah will dissipate, and so too will
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Syrian and Iranian influence in the country. The fact of the matter however is that this
approach has done little to advance the U.S. interests of stabilizing Lebanon and
marginalizing Hezbollah, Iran and Syria‘s power, as is evidenced by Hezbollah‘s
advances in military and political power.
To truly succeed in stabilizing Lebanon, the United States must abandon a purely
realist approach to Lebanon, and adopt a more constructivist approach to the issue of
Lebanese stability. Policymakers must ask themselves why Hezbollah insists on
remaining armed, why Iran and Syria are able to exploit the political turmoil for their
own political gain and why many Lebanese are so supportive of Hezbollah and its
financers. Chapter Five will shed further light on a more constructivist policy approach
that can fare better than the current one in promoting Lebanese stability.
Inconsistencies in U.S. Policy
A second general shortcoming of the current U.S. policy involves its
inconsistencies over the past five years. One inconsistency involves U.S. assistance
packages to Lebanon. While the cornerstone behind the current policy has been that a
stronger Lebanese government will diminish foreign interference and Hezbollahprovoked instability, the American commitment to this support has recently been called
into question. This inconsistency can be seen in the decreasing levels of U.S. military
assistance to Lebanon. Military support appropriations decreased from FY2009 to
FY2010 from roughly $227,000,000 to $145,500,000. The FY2011 request is even
lower, at $132,500,000.206
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One possible explanation for this is one that has been offered to explain why
procured military material has taken so long to reach Lebanon. This explanation claims
that there is a lack of cohesion in the U.S. foreign policymaking community on how best
to deal with Lebanon policy. A report from the Center for Strategic and International
Studies suggests that the Department of Defense and the Department of State may not be
in agreement on how to approach Lebanon. The issue of Israel‘s national security factors
significantly into the policymaking calculus, leading to some hesitation in providing
substantial military support to the Lebanese government.207
Concerns in the U.S. foreign policymaking community over Israeli security
cannot be overestimated in how it impacts Lebanon policy. Several events since the
summer of 2010 have prompted some in the U.S. government to question the prudence of
providing assistance to the Lebanese government. In early August 2010, House Foreign
Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman expressed concern over Lebanese
military-Hezbollah relations, resulting in a halt of U.S. assistance. An event the
following day which involved the killing of an Israeli military officer by Lebanese forces
further exacerbated the tension between U.S. policymakers and the Lebanese
government.208 Another unsettling event for the United States occurred in early 2011,
when Hezbollah‘s increase in political power in the Lebanese government prompted a
similar response from U.S. policymakers. A media report citing Obama Administration
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sources claimed that the United States, ―[…] will probably cut or realign […] aid if
Hezbollah takes over key ministries under a new prime minister, Najib Mikati […].‖209
These recent threats made by the U.S. government indicate an American halfheartedness to back Lebanese democracy. Despite the clear position the United States
has claimed in supporting democratic institutions, the U.S. government has been reluctant
to support an increasing Shia voice in the Lebanese government. Despite the
aforementioned statement made by Assistant Secretary Welch in his testimony before the
House subcommittee that the United States would not frown upon Hezbollah‘s role as a
political party in Lebanon, the U.S. government is doing just that. In the first months of
2011, the United States finds itself without a consensus in Washington on how to
approach Lebanon. This has resulted in an inconsistent policy at a time when the Middle
East is rapidly changing and there is pressure for democratic reform.
The failure of the post-2006 policy to advance U.S. interests, to take non-realist
factors into consideration and to be consistent requires a remapping of policy objectives
in Lebanon for the United States. The next chapter will highlight recommendations made
in response to these shortcomings.

209

Lee 2011.

75

Chapter Five – A New U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, the shortcomings of the current U.S. policy have
been illustrated, as have the challenges posed by Iran and Syria to U.S. interests. This
chapter will delineate how the United States should respond to the challenge for a new
policy in Lebanon.
Containment has been a key theme in U.S. policy toward the Middle East for over
half a century. While policy during the Cold War was driven largely by the interest of
containing the Soviet Union (see Chapter Two), the policies of the past several years
have reflected an interest in containing Iran. This must continue to be a core tenet of a
future policy toward Lebanon. However, important objectives such as the advancement
of Lebanese citizens (particularly the Shia) through economic and political development
and more harmonious relations between Lebanon and its neighbors must also be at the
center of this new policy.
The policy advocated in this chapter requires the United States to address
Lebanon through three tenets: minimizing Iranian influence in Lebanon, promoting
economic and political development in the country, and fostering more peaceful relations
between Lebanon and its neighbors. These three tenets will serve as the umbrella for a
new foreign policy, one which will be better suited for safeguarding U.S. interests and
dealing with the new Iranian and Syrian challenges. The next three sections will detail
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each tenet within the framework of military relations, political relations and economic
development relations.
Military Relations
There is a perception by some in Washington that the Lebanese government is
hostile to U.S. interests and thus not a suitable candidate for further U.S. assistance. This
perception is not only based on a misunderstanding of the complexities of the strategic
environment, but is one that will further jeopardize U.S. interests. Since the summer of
2010, these concerns have lead to a temporary moratorium on assistance. The saliency of
this issue continues to the present. In March 2011, the Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Steve Chabot, called for a termination
of military assistance to Lebanon in the event that Hezbollah emerges as a member of
Lebanon‘s government.210
It might be believed by some in Washington that by taking such an approach, the
United States will be weakening the influence of Hezbollah, and thus Iran, in Lebanon.
They assume that by pulling the plug on Lebanon‘s government, they will be
delegitimizing and reducing the power of Hezbollah. 211 They might also assume that if
the United States sends a strong signal of disapproval to the Lebanese government,
perhaps the Lebanese people will in turn look upon Hezbollah with disapproval for
having ostracized them militarily from the United States.
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Any such belief is a misperception of the reality in Lebanon. As stated in Chapter
Three, Hezbollah has been able to capitalize in the past on ensuring the protection of
Lebanon when the country‘s security is called into question. Moreover, as of late the
Iranian government itself has shown the willingness to directly provide military
assistance to Lebanon in the absence of U.S. support. Hezbollah and Iran have triumphed
in the past by providing for Lebanon when it was needed most, whether it be through
funding social programs or offering military aid. Today, the desire of some policymakers
in Washington to terminate assistance to the Lebanese military will yield yet another
opportunity for Hezbollah and Iran. Furthermore, such a policy would prove
counterproductive to the U.S. interests of containing Iran and promoting development in
Lebanon‘s governmental institutions.
It is recommended that in the interest of advancing the U.S. goals of containing
Iran and strengthening the Lebanese government, the United States continue with
providing high-levels of military assistance to the LAF and ISF. A third U.S. policy goal
can also be achieved in continuing to provide support to these forces: the promotion of
harmonious relations with Lebanon‘s neighbors. The previous chapter made mention of
allegations by the Israeli government concerning illegal weapons transfers into Lebanon,
including the possibility of SCUD missile transfers.
Given the history of Israeli military operations against Lebanon, it would be
prudent if the United States sought to take measures to prevent another conflict between
Israel and Lebanon. The provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701 seek for, ―[…] the
Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL […] to deploy their forces together throughout the
South […]‖ while pointing out, ―[…] the importance of the extension of the control of the
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Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory […].‖ 212 If the LAF and ISF have
the material, financing and training to operate in southern Lebanon, it could mitigate
Israel‘s concerns about another military campaign being necessary to neutralize threats in
the south of Lebanon. Ambassador Hill discusses the importance of ―confidencebuilding measures‖ in promoting peace between Israel and Lebanon. 213 By stabilizing
south Lebanon, the Lebanese military could increase Israeli confidence in the Lebanese
state in providing for the security of the south, decreasing the probability of another
military conflict.
One crucial military capability in particular that the United States must continue
to develop is a strong communications infrastructure for the Lebanese military. A 2011
report by the Congressional Research Service states that:
The LAF has only recently acquired limited secure communications capability
and is attempting to gradually expand this capability to all sectors and levels of
the LAF. The LAF currently relies on obsolete systems for radio communications
between its headquarters and units in the field. The tactical units of the LAF do
not have communications systems compatible with other agencies of the
government and the lack of reliable capability and interoperability with other
governmental agencies drives most commanders and staff officers to use land line
or cell phones as their primary means of communication. 214
While updating the LAF‘s communications systems has been a priority of U.S. military
assistance, particularly through expedited support under the National Defense
Authorization Act Section 1206,215 it is essential that the further development of military
communication infrastructure be supported by the United States.
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Hezbollah itself had the capabilities to develop a communications system that, it
is believed, assisted the organization in winning the 2006 conflict. According to a 2008
al Jazeera English article quoting the Lebanese Information Minister, ―‗[…] it [the
Hezbollah communications system] is illegal and constitutes a threat to the government‘s
sovereignty […].‘‖216 In the interests of ensuring political institutional development in
Lebanon as well as ensuring that the military is capable of protecting Lebanon in
Hezbollah‘s absence, it is essential that the United States continue to work with the LAF
through military assistance programs to develop their communications infrastructure.
While one may express skepticism about the expectation of the Lebanese military
being able to become Lebanon‘s only line of defense and to secure the south, recent
developments within the military suggest that they may be well-suited for the task. A
study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that the legitimacy of
the organization amongst the Lebanese population is high relative to other national
entities. The report states, ―[t]he LAF has shown that it is one of the few Lebanese
institutions in the post-Syria era trusted by a substantial cross-section of Lebanese
society.‖217 Also significant is the sizable Shia presence within the LAF, accounting for
nearly ―[…] 30 percent of the officers corps […].‖218 Hezbollah thus is not the only
means through which Shia in Lebanon can contribute to the national security of the
country.
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Political Relations
Another misperception that appears to exist in Washington is that military
assistance in itself could serve as a means to ensure that weapons are not illegally
transferred into Lebanon. The 2011 CRS report aforementioned states that:
[t]he Obama Administration and some members of the 111 th Congress have
supported the continuation of this [military assistance] program. They hope that
continued support will help secure Lebanon‘s borders against smuggling and, in
particular, against the flow of weapons to Hezbollah and other non-state actors.219
However, it would appear that military support is not sufficient to actually stop such
flows. This fact is proved by the report that Hezbollah has far more weapons than it did
prior to the spike in U.S. military support. Additionally, according to the U.N. Secretary
General‘s 2010 report on UNSC Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government ―[…] did not
report any breach of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1701 (2006).‖220 This
suggests that the Lebanese government may either be turning a blind eye to these
weapons transfers, or may actually be helping to facilitate them. Therefore, the solution
to the problem involves not addressing the issue of weapons transfers, but rather the issue
of why Hezbollah seeks weapons.
It is essential that policymakers in Washington begin to look at the broader
picture in the context that has allowed for Hezbollah‘s existence as a militia. Paul Salem
sheds light on one such factor, positing that the lack of power on the part of Lebanon‘s
government, including the military, has been a driving-force for the organization.221 A
second significant factor is the organization‘s role as a very successful force in the
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opposition against Israel. This role is much the product of support from Syria and Iran.
As Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson conclude, ―[…] absent a larger Israel-Syria
peace accord, outright disarmament of Hezbollah – i.e., the destruction or custodial
transfer of weapons – is infeasible.‖222 It is not only a peace agreement between Syria
and Israel that would be necessary for disarmament. Paul Salem posits that the
occupation of the Shebaa Farms has also emerged as an impetus for Hezbollah to remain
a militia. 223
Given this reality, two broad political goals must be advanced by the United
States. First, the Lebanese government must facilitate the advancement of Shia in
Lebanon. Second, an Arab-Israeli peace agreement must be pursued, which will make
Hezbollah‘s militia unnecessary.
Bringing Lebanese Shia into the Political Process
There is significant evidence to support the argument that Hezbollah can be demilitarized and brought into the political process in Lebanon as a peaceful player. A
2008 book by the RAND Corporation entitled How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for
Countering al Qa’ida presents research findings on 648 terrorist organizations over forty
years, and concludes, ―[…] that a transition to the political process is the most common
way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent).‖224 Furthermore, Hezbollah is
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classified in the study as an organization geared toward ―regime change.‖225 One of the
conclusions reached in the study was that in the case of organizations with, ―[…] minimal
goals, such as policy change, governments may be able to reach a negotiated settlement
with the group.‖226
While changing a government is not nearly as simple as changing policies, it is
quite possible that a change in the composition of Lebanon‘s government can be
sufficient in the eyes of Hezbollah to achieve their goals. Perhaps as Hezbollah plays a
larger role in the governance of Lebanon, and is able to impact changes in policy and
play a component in the regime, their militant existence will become superfluous. In the
context of politics, it is important to note that Hassan Nasrallah as well as others within
Hezbollah have made clear that they do not support turning Lebanon into an Islamic
country, and do not seek to change the Lebanese ―multicultural society.‖ 227 Therefore,
despite RAND‘s categorization of Hezbollah as an organization looking to change the
government of Lebanon, they appear to be more concerned with enhancing power within
the current government.
If the Lebanese government enhances its ability to provide security and social
services to Shia, there is no reason to believe that Hezbollah cannot de-militarize.
Therefore, the United States should seek to reinforce Lebanese sovereignty, develop their
military and enhance the quality of life of Lebanese Shia to help facilitate this transition
from a militarized movement.
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If Hezbollah is to be demilitarized in the long-term, the United States must work
with the Lebanese government to address the reasons discussed in Chapter Three that fuel
Hezbollah‘s existence. As was mentioned, one of the two major reasons for its existence
is the national security of Lebanon. Beginning in the 1980s, through the 1990s and in
2006, Hezbollah has been the region‘s only entity capable of waging a war against Israel.
If Hezbollah is to disarm and continue to move toward existing purely as a political
entity, the need for a strong non-governmental defense against Israel must be eliminated.
While arming the Lebanese government to promote Israeli confidence as discussed
earlier is one step toward this goal, a more substantial step must involve ending the
occupation.
If the Israeli threat to the Arab World is neutralized through a peace agreement,
Hezbollah will be forced to find a new principal objective to work towards and to build
appeal on – an objective that will likely take the form of the advancement of Shia in the
political realm. Without disarming and without an enemy, Hezbollah would risk
ostracizing itself from the Lebanese population and consequently from Lebanese politics.
It appears that Hezbollah is principally concerned with its goal of championing the
resistance movement against Israel. 228 After all, resistance is the concept that the
organization was established on in the 1980s. However, as Simon and Stevenson posit, a
shift may be underway to focus more on the political realm. 229
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Lacking a nationalist connection to Iran and without a vision for an Islamic
Lebanon, resistance to Israel remains the only significant theme other than a common
religion linking Hezbollah to Iran. Once the Israeli occupation has totally ended, and
once it is clear that Israel and Lebanon are on a track toward rapprochement, Hezbollah
will have to decisively shift its primary goal from militancy to political involvement if it
is going to survive.
The Implementation of an Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement
The argument that a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli process is necessary
for the disarmament of Hezbollah is not one made solely by this author; Numerous
experts on Lebanon have shed light on this reality. Paul Salem argues that:
[i]f Resolution 1701 is successfully implemented - - if the army can secure the
south, there are no future Israeli attacks, Shebaa Farms is handed over to UN
control, and all captives are returned -- the task of persuading Hezbollah to disarm
will be easier, since its raison d‘etre as a militia will be compromised. 230
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson also make similar claims. While stopping short of
advocating for an Arab-Israeli resolution as a means to disarm Hezbollah, they
acknowledge the importance and impact of an agreement. They write:
[o]ne lesson here [the allegations of Syrian SCUD missiles being transferred to
Hezbollah] is that absent a larger Israel-Syria peace accord, outright disarmament
of Hezbollah – i.e., the destruction or custodial transfer of weapons – is
infeasible. 231
Cathy Sultan also references Hezbollah‘s commitment to Lebanese security in this
regard, stating, ―Hezbollah, certain the territory [the Shebaa Farms] belonged to Lebanon,
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maintained that as long as Israel continued to occupy this tiny piece of land, it would not
relinquish its arms.‖232
It is recommended that the U.S. government accept the theory that disarming
Hezbollah is incumbent upon fostering peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, most
importantly Syria and Lebanon. This theory should become the underlying assumption
behind the U.S. approach to Lebanon and its security regarding Hezbollah. This policy
framework could also yield dividends in terms of providing guidance in addressing other
threats such as Hamas.
One important first step the United States can take in the direction of chipping
away at the Arab-Israeli conflict would be to work toward the implementation of the
Seven Point Plan presented in 2006.233 Among the provisions of the plan is that the
international community work:
[…] to place the Shebaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN
jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully
settled. While in UN custody, the area will be accessible to Lebanese property
owners there. Further, Israel surrenders all remaining landmine maps in South
Lebanon to the UN.234
The idea of ending the occupation of the Shebaa Farms to help facilitate Hezbollah‘s
giving up its weapons is also proposed by Simon and Stevenson. 235 Other provisions of
the plan include the United Nations taking steps to foster more peaceful relations between
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Lebanon and Israel. These provisions will also be consistent with the aforementioned
defense assistance plan of providing the Lebanese military the means to stabilize the
south of the country. 236
In addition to providing the United Nations with landmine maps, the United
States should also work with the Israeli government to provide maps indicating the
locations where cluster bombs were dropped in southern Lebanon. As of 2008, the
agricultural areas in the south were plagued by the presence of unexploded cluster bombs.
According to Cathy Sultan, ―The United Nations estimates that thirty percent of South
Lebanon‘s cultivatable land was affected by cluster bombs. […] An estimated ninety
percent of the local population depends on agriculture.‖237 As of 2008, the United
Nations had not been provided with the locations of these bombs, despite the request of
Human Rights Watch. 238
A brief aside on U.S. policy toward Israel is necessary. The Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks attempted by President Obama were met with half-heartedness by the
Netanyahu Administration in Jerusalem. Prime Minister Netanyahu‘s government was
reluctant to compromise on an issue viewed by the Palestinians, the United States and the
international community as critical to progress on peace talks: the discontinuation of
building settlements.239
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Given the failure of these talks at the hands of the Israeli government, the Obama
Administration is left in a position of leverage to re-launch talks in a direction seen as
appropriate by the United States. Without threatening Israel yet without remaining
passive to the situation, the United States is in a position to hinge U.S. military assistance
to Israel on an Israeli commitment to the Seven Point Plan. This can be done in such a
way that the potential reduction in aid levels would not jeopardize Israeli national
security, but would show that the United States is serious about resolving the Israeli
dispute with Lebanon immediately. This plan must be packaged to Israel in such a way
that it is abundantly clear that resolving the Shebaa Farms issue is a necessary first-step
in the disarmament of Hezbollah, and thus in the national security interests of Israel.
This would involve addressing the geostrategic value that the Israeli government has
placed on the Shebaa Farms broadly and southern Lebanon in general, outside of the
realm of the Hezbollah threat.
One key Israeli interest in the south of Lebanon pertains to water security, and the
Israeli government‘s efforts to provide water for its population. Water security is a
tremendous issue in Israel; it is believed that an inability to secure access to usable water
was an impetus behind the Israeli settler disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005. 240
Israel is struggling to secure access to water, and southern Lebanon has proven to be a
prime source of it for the Israelis. The Litani River in Lebanon is perceived by Israel to
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be an important future source of water, especially given its low salt levels. 241 The Shebaa
Farms and Hashbani River are other potential sources of water for Israel, and the Israelis
have been able to exploit these resources. According to Cathy Sultan, the DirectorGeneral of the Litani River Authority has suggested that the Israeli penetration of these
water resources has cost Lebanon ―over $2 billion.‖242 Sultan argues that while the Litani
River cannot serve as a source of water for both countries simultaneously, the water in
the Shebaa Farms area potentially can if a deal between Israel and Lebanon was to be
reached. 243 She also acknowledges the fact that, ―[…] Israel‘s withdrawal from the
Shebaa Farms would strengthen the Siniora government because it could then
legitimately call on Hezbollah to disarm.‖ 244
Negotiations over the return of the Shebaa Farms could and should include a
discussion on the sharing of the water resources in the area. Israel can benefit from
working toward the disarmament of Hezbollah and securing access to Lebanese water
through a legally-binding international agreement. This can serve as an important first
step toward a broader Arab-Israeli agreement. But by resolving a major
Israeli/Lebanese/Syrian dispute over an easily solvable issue in the near-term, the United
States can gradually obviate the need for a Shia militia within Lebanon while also
chipping away at the anti-Israeli links between Syria and Hezbollah on the one hand, and
Iran on the other.
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The recent discovery of natural gas in the Mediterranean off the coast of Israel
underscores the need for progress to be made for a peace agreement between Israel and
Lebanon. The field found in 2009 in Israeli waters was the world‘s biggest at the time.
Oil has also been found in the area. The absence of a formal maritime border between
Israel and Lebanon complicates the situation. According to a Christian Science Monitor
report, ―[i]n the absence of a mutual agreement on the border and division of resources,
Israel could follow the ‗right of capture‘ rule, which allows a nation to extract oil or gas
from its side of the border, even if the reserves stretch into another country‘s territory.‖245
The situation is further strained by Lebanon‘s debt and the possibility of natural resource
revenues. It is also complicated by Hezbollah‘s defiance to turn to violence against Israel
if Lebanese oil and gas resources are exploited by Jerusalem. 246
A formal maritime border must be an important component of any initial
agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Without it, Hezbollah can argue that its arms
are needed to protect Lebanon‘s energy interests, and it will become increasingly difficult
to get the organization to disarm. Again, the Israeli government must be convinced by
the United States that it is in their long-term security interests to formalize the border and
to respect it when it comes to resource extraction.
Economic Development Relations
The United States can greatly enhance the prospects for Lebanese stability and the
protection of U.S. interests through improving its economic development assistance to
245

Nicholas Blanford, "Oil and Gas Discoveries Produce Potential Israel-Lebanon Flash-Points," The
Christian Science Monitor (November 1, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2010/1101/Oil-and-gas-discoveries-produce-potential-Israel-Lebanon-flash-points (accessed April 26,
2011).
246

Blanford 2010.

90

Lebanon. A strong assistance program can have multiple positive effects on U.S. security
interests. Development can help advance democratization as well as create an
environment that is less conducive to the kinds of radicalization sought by Hezbollah.
Several works have studied the impact of economic development on democratization.
One prominent piece is by Martin Lipset, in which he argues:
Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy by
changing the social conditions of the workers, but it also affects the political role
of the middle class through changing the shape of the stratification structure so
that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a
diamond with a growing middle-class. A large middle class plays a mitigating
role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic
parties and penalize extremist groups.247
A more contemporary work that sheds light on the nexus of economics, democracy and
terrorism is offered by Eva Bellin, who explores the relationship between development
on the one hand, and the proliferation of democracy and prevention of radicalization on
the other. She states:
Although the cause of Islamic radicalism cannot be reduced to simple economics,
it seems plausible to argue that the pervasive unemployment, stagnating living
standards, and general hopelessness found in much of the MENA [Middle East
and North Africa] region help to fuel its spread. Attacking these problems
through economic growth would likely diminish the mass appeal of radical
Islamists, unplug key motivations for violence and terror, and foster the political
moderation that is essential to viable democracy. 248
Keeping in mind this important role of development in achieving U.S. strategic interests,
there are several policy recommendations that can be made.
Last, a strong U.S. development program could also help to improve the
perception of the United States amongst the Lebanese general populace. Ambassador
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Hill posits that the perception of the United States in Lebanon could improve by creating
the view that ―we [the United States] care about Lebanon‖ beyond its role in the ArabIsraeli Peace Process.249
Broader Financial Support for Development from the United States
First, by working with the Lebanese government to facilitate the development of
the economy, particularly in Shia parts of the country, the Lebanese government can
increase its power relative to Hezbollah. If financial capital from the United States
helped support the development of Lebanon, particularly the south, the need for
Hezbollah‘s services and aid from Iran will become unnecessary. In this time of onerous
federal budget deficits, the funding for this support does not necessarily have to come
from the purse of the U.S. government. The U.S. Department of State has an opportunity
to build on the support of the numerous Lebanese political organizations that exist within
the United States to pool resources that could be used toward development initiatives.
As Kail Ellis points out, there are at least half a dozen politically-oriented entities
in the United States which broadly seek to advance Lebanese independence. 250 One
organization not mentioned by Ellis but significant nonetheless is the Aspen Institute, the
participation of which could be greatly beneficial to a State Department-led development
initiative, particularly given the work of its U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program. According
to the dialogue‘s website:
[t]he U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program encourages productive U.S.-Lebanon
relations, promotes discussion on Lebanon in Washington, and supports initiatives
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that strengthen Lebanese independence and sovereignty. […] [T]he Program also
supports initiatives that advance Lebanese political reform, economic
development, and social progress.251
The institute is involved in a regional development financing program similar to the one
advocated in this thesis. The Aspen Institute‘s Middle East Investment Initiative is ―[…]
a public-private partnership of the Aspen Institute, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, and the Palestinian Investment Fund.‖252 This partnership provides
financing in the form of ―[…] a $228 million loan guarantee program for small and
medium-sized businesses in the Palestinian Territories.‖ 253 The goal of this development
program is to promote employment opportunities in the territories and to help facilitate
home ownership.254
In addition to the development initiatives already underway by the United States
in Lebanon, the State Department can work closely with these organizations in
developing a fund that can aid new initiatives. The State Department is no stranger to
spearheading such funds in the Middle East. One initiative that promoted
democratization in the region was the Middle East Democracy Fund, which used grants
to help support democratic initiatives through USAID.255
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The strength of the organizational capabilities of the Department of State, the
presence of organizations such as the Aspen Institute, the robust Lebanese civil society in
the United States and the large U.S. donor base creates an environment conducive to
launching such a development initiative. The State Department can work closely with the
Lebanese government to identify specific communities and initiatives that could create
jobs and enhance the quality of life for those in poorer areas in Lebanon. As the
aforementioned divide between Lebanese nationalism and Iran‘s agenda of using
Hezbollah to advance its own interests becomes greater and tenser, capital flows from the
United States in support of development initiatives could ensure that Iran does not
capitalize on a lack of Western assistance to Lebanon.
To strengthen the developmental and security potential of this program, it is
recommended that two conditions be placed on this assistance. First, it should be
required that the Lebanese government make a larger commitment toward privatizing
major industries. Lebanon has been plagued by an economic and legal environment in
which doing business, particularly securing investment, has been difficult.256 The
Lebanese government however has already taken major steps to combat the difficulties
associated with starting new businesses in the country. Data from Figure 1 (figures
located in appendix A) indicates that from 2007 to 2010, the government cut the number
of days needed to launch a business from 46 to only nine. This time period ranks well
relative to nearby Israel, Syria and Jordan, where time periods for 2010 were 34, 13 and
13 days, respectively. As Figure 2 shows, the number of steps necessary to launch a
business in 2010 was lower in Lebanon than in Syria, Jordan or Turkey. Lebanon is tied
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with Israel in this category, and has seen a slight decline in the number of steps since
2007.
While launching a business has become easier in Lebanon, it is more difficult to
sustain business operations in the country. In Figure 3, data from the World Bank Ease
of Doing Business Index shows that government policies in Lebanon make it more
difficult to do business there relative to Israel, Jordan and Turkey (far more difficult in
the cases of Israel and Turkey). U.S. assistance through the proposed support fund
should be incumbent upon the Lebanese government taking steps to improve its position
on the Ease of Doing Business Index by altering policies that may hinder the ability of
firms to conduct business.
A second condition of this assistance should be requirements for the Lebanese
government to take larger steps toward privatizing critical industries. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has shed light on the importance of privatization in Lebanon in a
2010 report. The IMF states that privatization, particularly in the telecommunications
and commercial aviation industries, could have several beneficial effects on the broader
economy. With regards to the former, they posit that, ―[t]elecom privatization could
enhance the economy‘s growth potential while helping to reduce the public debt.‖257 In
terms of aviation, the report states that privatizing the Lebanese airline MEA could be to
the financial benefit of the central bank.258
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Privatization can serve not only to increase efficiencies in the delivery of essential
services, but it could also save the Lebanese government money in the process. By
reducing the government‘s financial obligations to telecommunications and aviation, the
government will be in a better position to invest capital and other resources in
development initiatives. One strategy that could perhaps be pushed by the United States
in promoting privatization in Lebanon could be the use of Public Private Partnerships
(PPPs). The aforementioned IMF report discusses how these partnerships could be used
as a middle-ground initiative between the private sector providing services and the
government administration of services. Such a strategy could yield positive effects such
as, ―[…] the potential for higher quality services at lower costs.‖259 Lebanon‘s
government is working toward PPP programs according to the IMF,260 but the United
States can strive to make sure that such programs are eventually executed.
By promoting the growth of the private sector, fostering job growth, expanding
access to important services and developing critical areas of the Lebanese economy, the
United States can help ensure that a social environment emerges in Lebanon that is not
conducive to the kinds of inequality that Hezbollah has taken advantage of in the past.
There is also reason to believe that the political uncertainty that currently exists in
Lebanon could be an impetus to a restructuring of the Lebanese economy. Eva Bellin
posits, ―[…] that a dual context of crisis and hope constitutes the best condition for
reform readiness.‖261 Given this, the time would seem ripe for a firm U.S. commitment
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to helping the Lebanese government in restructuring and developing the Lebanese
economy.
Trade and Security
The positive effects of economic development on advancing democratization and
promoting a more peaceful Lebanese society can also be realized by building trade
relations between Lebanon and the rest of the world, particularly with its immediate
neighbors. These agreements, namely any one including Syria or Israel, should include
provisions that would help ensure that international law be upheld by all parties, so as to
link economic prosperity with security. In the realm of trade, the United States currently
has opportunities to engage the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the small regional
bloc that has come together to form a local free trade area.
The impact that trade can have on international relations and security is explored
by Dale Copeland. Copeland‘s theory is that economic interdependence through trade is
not sufficient to prevent states from fighting. The essential component to
interdependence yielding peaceful ends is the anticipation in the countries trading that
trade volume will remain strong.262 By promoting free trade relations between Lebanon,
Syria and possibly Israel in the long-term, the United States can foster an economic
interdependence that makes the incidence of war or conflict between them unlikely.
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With regards to WTO membership, the Lebanese government has been working
for 12 years to become a member of the body. While a ―Working Party‖ was created
twelve years ago, the WTO website suggests that there have been no developments
regarding Lebanon‘s membership process since the party met in the fall of 2009. 263 The
State Department currently looks favorably upon Lebanese membership to the WTO, 264
but steps should be taken so that this goal is followed through with in the near-term and
not abandoned as members of Congress have already threatened to abandon support to
Lebanon.
The impact that promoting trade liberalization in the Middle East can have on the
relations of the region is highlighted by trade expert Mike Pullen in a June 2009 al
Jazeera article. Pullen proposes that the model of ―economic development and regional
integration‖ that prevailed in Europe following World War II could also be the key to
more harmonious relations in the Middle East.265 By pursuing the development support
initiatives mentioned earlier in this chapter, namely privatization, the United States can
ensure that Lebanon is coming closer to meeting the requirements of becoming a member
of the WTO. According to Chapter Five of the Handbook on Accession to the WTO,
privatization of industry is a process that factors quite significantly into the membership
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selection process.266 Therefore, the conditions to the previously mentioned development
financing program would go hand-in-hand in helping to also achieve Lebanese
membership to the WTO.
Aside from the WTO negotiations, Lebanon will soon be party to a free trade
agreement with Turkey, Syria and Jordan.267 While it is unclear how much progress has
been made on the agreements with Jordan and Syria, Lebanon entered its agreement with
Turkey in November 2010.268 The progress being made toward a free trade agreement
between Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan provides a prime opportunity for the United
States to advance its interests of developing the Lebanese economy, fostering normalized
Lebanese-Syrian relations and encouraging the proliferation of free trade. There is also
an opportunity for the United States to engage Lebanon, Turkey, Syria and Jordan to
assure that trade taking place under this agreement is in conformance with UNSC
Resolution 1701.
The United States can engage the governments of those involved in the
agreement(s) to have UNSC Resolution 1701 compliance measures incorporated into the
agreement. For example, if weapons shipments were found to be taking place between
Syria and Lebanon, the matter could immediately be taken up by the WTO, and
protectionist measures can be taken by the Lebanese government against Syria. The
266
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current trade relationship between Syria and Lebanon is substantial. Lebanon is Syria‘s
second-largest export market – a destination for over 12% of Syria‘s exports.269 By
giving the Lebanese government the power to impose import restrictions, tariffs or quotas
against Syrian imports in the event that violations of Resolution 1701 are discovered, the
Syrian government may be deterred from allowing illegal weapons transactions to
Hezbollah.
The United States should work to engage the Lebanese government and the
governments of European states with close relations to Lebanon to push for trade
liberalization and Lebanese inclusion in trade schemes. A long-term trade liberalization
goal of the United States can be to eventually establish a trade agreement between
Lebanon and Israel.
Conclusion
The political, military and economic policies prescribed in this chapter have been
offered in response to a thorough analysis of the shortcomings of the current U.S. policy
and the threats that the United States will continue to face in Lebanon in the future.
While the current policy is plagued by contradictions, special care has been given to
make recommendations that are not only compatible with one another, but also
complement each other. Consistent themes of multilateralism, economic liberalism, and
consolidating Lebanese state military power are present throughout.
Implementing these recommendations would not involve a significant deviation
from the course of the current U.S. policy. Rhetorically, the United States has expressed
its support for promoting democracy in Lebanon, increasing Lebanese military power,
269

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook [Syria].

100

developing the economy and facilitating a peace agreement. These recommendations are
offered as the most effective ways of achieving those ends.
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Chapter Six – Conclusions and Final Thoughts
Wilsonianism has been at play in U.S. relations with Lebanon since the era of the
missionaries. In the 19th century, these relations were about the proliferation of religious
ideals. Today, relations are focused on the spreading of democratic principles.
Containment, first of the Soviet Union and now of Iran, has also loomed large in this
policy. However, the record since 2006 shows that the current U.S. policy suffers from
shortcomings and contradictions. While limited progress has been made in promoting
democratization, all other policy goals have experienced shortcomings. This reality
merits a reevaluation of the policy.
The Costs of Maintaining the Status-Quo
The worldview that democracies are the ideal system of government has been
embraced in the Wilsonian paradigm of foreign policy making in the United States. Its
evidence can be seen in fostering the birth of democratic governments after World War
II, maintaining close relations with the Western European democratic states during the
Cold War,270 and in promoting democratization in the Middle East under the
neoconservative tenets of the George W. Bush Administration. 271
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Promoting democratization is certainly not a troublesome policy if it is exercised
consistently. The central problem that this thesis has identified is that the current policy
toward supporting Lebanese democracy has been inconsistent. While the United States
has offered support to reinforce Lebanon‘s democratic institutions in the past, there is
currently the possibility that this support could be terminated, as has been threatened, if
Hezbollah continues to play a role in the government. By making such demands,
policymakers in the United States are placing a condition on the Lebanese democracy –
an expectation that it will conform to an American vision of what that democracy should
look like. Furthermore, a significant portion of the Lebanese population would be
ostracized politically if Hezbollah were to be kept out of government, thus detracting
from the government‘s democratic character.
A second risk of maintaining the status-quo relates to Iran‘s power. Many of the
threats that exist to the United States and its interests in the Middle East emanate from
Iran. Concerns exist of how this government could use its potential future nuclear arsenal
toward a number of ends, including jeopardizing oil flows and maritime traffic in the
Strait of Hormuz and inflicting violence on Israel through Hamas or Hezbollah. 272
However, the American response to these threats has yielded a self-fulfilling prophecy
that has resulted in the United States being unable to make progress on the relationship
with Iran and in advancing ―interests in common‖ with Iran. 273 So long as tensions
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remain between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it will almost
assuredly have implications in Lebanon as Iran continues to project its power in Lebanon
and against Israel through Hezbollah.
If relations between the United States and Iran are to remain tense, then the
United States must ensure that Lebanese militancy is eliminated as a policy option for the
Iranian leadership. A more prudent policy goal of the United States would be to seek a
rapprochement with the Islamic state.274 It is well acknowledged though by this author
that many of the policies of the Iranian government may make rapprochement politically
infeasible at the moment. Therefore, eliminating Hezbollah‘s militia is the only sure way
to ensure that these tensions do not have implications on U.S. interests in Lebanon and
Israel. The current policy toward Lebanon has proven incapable of containing Iran thus
far. Thus, the recommendations of Chapter Five should be explored by policymakers.
The Challenges for the United States
The coming months will certainly be challenging for U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East as policymakers react to regional trends toward governmental change. In
this context, the United States is being forced to adapt to the reality of having to support
democratization in the Middle East, even if that does not necessarily translate into a proAmerican or pro-Western regime. U.S. policymakers must realize that democracy will
not always yield a regime that shares the same perspective and interests as Washington.
Specifically, members of the administration and the Congress must accept that
Hezbollah‘s involvement in the Lebanese government is a part of that country‘s
274
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democracy, and that taking measures against the country as a result of that would be
counterproductive to U.S. interests.
The recent developments in Syria may very well complicate U.S. efforts to
facilitate some of the peace-building measures advocated in this paper in the immediate
short-term. However, that does not mean that the United States is incapable at the
moment of capitalizing on the situation to protect its interests in Lebanon. Simon and
Stevenson highlight one current trend:
[w]hatever Assad‘s current disposition, Syria remains regionally weaker, and that
fact may well have changed the Hezbollah leadership‘s calculations about
Hezbollah‘s political legitimacy versus the retention of arms and posture of antiIsraeli resistance. […] Given it‘s now-established political legitimacy in Lebanon
and Syria‘s attenuated influence there, Hezbollah has sufficient political freedom
to embark on a slow path to disarmament. 275
It would be a wasted opportunity if the United States continues to try to impede
Hezbollah‘s politicization and the likelihood of Hezbollah progressing toward
disarming.276
Lebanon is unique in that it is one of the few governments in the Middle East to
be built on democratic principles. The United States has made efforts, particularly since
2006, to sustain that democracy. However, unless the quality of life is increased in
Lebanon – particularly for the Shia – unless all the people of Lebanon have a fair voice in
the country‘s government and unless the security situation concerning foreign
involvement and the relationship with Israel improves, popular unrest could yet again
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become a reality. Such unrest is not new to Lebanon, and has been seen in the streets of
many Arab capitals in recent months. Hezbollah would almost certainly capitalize off
such disenchantment, as they have in the past, and maximize their power-base. With an
inconsistent and contradictory Lebanon policy and an immobile peace process, the United
States is ill-equipped at the present to prevent such an outcome. The United States
cannot risk pursuing inconsistent and inadequate policies in Lebanon any longer.
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Appendices
Appendix A - Figures
Data from all graphs obtained from the online database of the World Bank. All graphs
were created by the author. The numerical data for Figures 1-3 can be found in Figure 4.
Figure 1: "Time required to start a business (days)
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From: The World Bank, Data | The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed
April 23, 2011). According to The World Bank: ―Time required to start a business is the
number of calendar days needed to complete the procedures to legally operate a business.
If a procedure can be speeded up at additional cost, the fastest procedure, independent of
cost, is chosen.‖
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Figure 2: "Start-up procedures to register a business
(number)"
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From: The World Bank, n.d. According to The World Bank: ―Start-up procedures are
those required to start a business, including interactions to obtain necessary permits and
licenses and to complete all inscriptions, verifications, and notifications to start
operations. Data are for businesses with specific characteristics of ownership, size, and
type of production.
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Figure 3: "Ease of doing business index (1= most
business-friendly regulations)"
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From: The World Bank, n.d. According to The World Bank: ―Ease of doing business
index ranks economies from 1 to 183, with first place being the best. A high ranking
means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation. The index
ranks the simple average of the country‘s percentile rankings on 10 topics covered in the
World Bank‘s Doing Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the
percentile rankings on its component indicators.‖
Figure 4 - Data from The World Bank Used in Figures 1-3
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Appendix B - Maps
Figure 5 - Kurdish Areas in Iraq and Their Proximity to Syria

From: Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, "Kurdish Region Under Increasing Threat,
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (May 16, 2007),
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076522.html (accessed April 30, 2011)
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Figure 6 - Map of Lebanon

From: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook [Lebanon],
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html (accessed April
30, 2011)
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